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misled1 or duplicitous,2 they should become aware of and disclose the 
real reasons for their decisions. 
I propose we reconsider this consensus position. Perhaps judges 
should be candid but not introspective. By candid, I mean never being 
consciously duplicitous. Candid opinions do not offer reasons judges 
know do not persuade them. 3 By introspective, I mean critically ex-
amining one's mental states to avoid any self-deception or error.4 Be-
havior is nonintrospective if it cannot be done by someone who is 
aware of its nature. In this article, I consider whether judges ought to 
decide candidly but nonintrospectively.5 
Demands for introspection were prevalent among the legal realists, 
who complained that judges did not understand their own decisions. 6 
The realists urged judges to recognize and to disclose the motivations 
1. See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Binder, On Critical Legal 
Studies as Guerrilla Warfare, 16 GEO. L.J. 1, 29 (1987); Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 
86 MICH. L. REv. 827, 865 (1988); Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of the Trial Judge's 
Decision-Making. 39 MERCER L. REv. 937 (1988); Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 537, 579-92 (1982). 
2. See Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 721 (1979); D. Shapiro, In De-
fense of Judicial Candor. 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987). But see M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLI-
TICS IN THE SUPREME CoURT 27 (1964) (admitting that while judicial candor might be best in 
theory, courts are political agencies and "politics is the art of the possible here and now."); 
Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process. 35 STAN. L. REV. 
213, 249-57 (1983) (arguing that calls for candor in the judicial process ignore the mitigating 
effects of legal fictions on judicial incompetence and bad faith); Zeppos, Judicial Candor and 
Statutory Interpretation, 18 GEO. L.J. 353, 411-12 (1989) (arguing that calls for judicial candor 
are premature until the judicial decisionmaking process is better understood). 
3. I ignore the question of failure to disclose fully all of the reasons that persuade. 
4. Although I adopt the word "introspection" for convenience, I do not mean to adopt its 
psychologically or philosophicclly controversial associations. I do not commit myself to a theory 
of knowledge or truth that requires a single truth about one's mental states. I also do not assume 
that we in fact gain knowledge about our mental function from some special process of internal 
viewing, rather than from making inferences from our own behavior. See Nisbett & Wilson, 
Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Process, 84 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 
·231 (1977). There are strong reasons for thinking that perfect access to our own mental states is 
not possible. By introspection, I mean only attempting (by whatever process we in fact use) to 
examine our mental states in a critical way in order to improve our beliefs about them. 
5. This article does not join issue directly with David Shapiro, who defends judicial candor 
against five reasons for judges to lie - continuity, collegiality, fear of the effects of knowledge, 
tragic choices, and moral duties. I do not consider whether judges ought to lie. See D. Shapiro, 
supra note 2. I focus on whether judges should introspect. Shapiro avoids this topic: "A judge 
•.. fulfills any requirement of candor when he believes what he is saying .••. " Id. at 734. "I do 
not mean to include self-deception within the scope of this inquiry." Id. at 732: 
6. Thurman Arnold saw legal discourse as a tool for denial and rationalization: 
[W]e must consider institutions ... as living organisms, not dissimilar to human personali-
ties, molded by habit, shaken by emotional conflicts, turned this way and that by words, 
constantly making good resolutions which affect them but not in the way that the terminol-
ogy of the resolutions might indicate, and never quite understanding themselves ..• because 
of the necessary illusions with which they must surround themselves to preserve their prestige 
and self-respect. 
T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GoVERNMENT 25-26 (1935) (emphasis added); see also id. at 33-
38. 
Jerome Frank found the myth of certainty attributable to a child's need for control over the 
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that the judges deny, and rationalize by appeal to doctrine.7 
Some Critical Legal Studies (CLS) critics attempt to induce intro-
spection. 8 By demonstrating that judges are either mistaken or lying 
about their decision process, critics would compel judges to abandon 
current practices as dishonest and harmful.9 These modem critics de-
mand introspection both because they think that a legal system in 
which some participants misunderstand their roles cannot be justified, 
and because they believe that false judicial beliefs lead to less desirable 
decisions. 
I have reservations about attempts to induce judges to develop per-
fectly accurate views of their tasks. Although I think judges are not so 
misled as CLS writers allege, it seems to me possible that judges hold 
inaccurate beliefs about their jobs, and that a legal system including 
such beliefs could be justified. 
In Part I, I consider whether judges might hold inaccurate beliefs 
that make them more candid and constrained. I suggest that even if 
theories of neutral decisionmak.ing are incomplete and inaccurate, a 
legal system in which judges hold these beliefs about their own behav-
ior could have advantages. If many judges believe that they can, 
should, and do decide almost all cases by following the law, they 
might behave differently than they would if they held more accurate 
world, which after infancy is displaced by belief in a father's omnipotence, and which still later is 
filled by beliefin the certainty of the law. See J. FRANK, supra note 1, at 141-42. 
Max Radin held a similar, though less psychological view. See Radin, The Theory of Judicial 
Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357, 360 (1925) ("Practical as we profess to be, we 
have buttered our parsnips with fine words so much, it is sometimes hard to find the succulent 
vegetable under the oleomargarine."). 
7. Arnold saw that these mechanisms could not work once people recognized them as such: 
[T]he philosophy which is here represented is not, and cannot be, a philosophy which will 
work pragmatically for intellectuals .••• Folklore which is frankly recognized by a people to 
be folklore is from that moment no longer folklore. Its magic is gone, and a new folklore, 
which is not so recognized, must arise. 
T. ARNOLD, supra note 6, at 237. Arnold dismissed these functions as inappropriate, and seemed 
to yearn for introspection. See id. at 229; cf. J. FRANK, supra note 1, at 157 ("[A]lthough fear of 
legal uncertainty leads to this concealment, ••• [t]he concealment has merely made the labor of 
judges less effective."); Radin, supra note 6, at 360 ("I want them taken for what they are, for the 
poetry of the law chanted to fill our hearts with the proper juristic ardor before the battle begins; 
but we should see to it that the bards and poets are carefully led to the side-lines when the 
conflict is on."). 
8. American CLS scholars often seem to adopt a version of immanent (or internal) critique 
from the Frankfurt school theorists. The traditional notion was simple: demonstrate that peo-
ple's conception of something does not conform to that thing in the world, in hopes that the 
people will then abandon or modify their conception once confronted with the conflict. See 
Brosnan, Serious But Not Critical, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 332-38 (1987). Recent followers of 
the Frankfurt school have been careful to point out that this tactic will only work in special 
circumstances. See, e.g., R. GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRmCAL THEORY 76 (1981) (critical theory 
will only work if actors adopt it as their "self-consciousness."). 
9. See, e.g., Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 
(1984). 
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beliefs. They might behave so as to facilitate repression and denial, 
because their self-esteem depends on maintaining the belief that they 
decide as they think they ought to decide. I suggest that such psycho-
logical mechanisms preserve candor and help law to constrain 
decisions. 
In Part II, I assume that inaccurate beliefs preserve candor and 
help law constrain, and I inquire whether we should prefer such a 
system to one with completely introspective judges. I suggest that en-
couraging judges to understand their decision process better, if effec-
tive at all, could be harmful, would probably not succeed, and even if 
successful might not be worth doing. · 
I do not pretend that nonintrospection is ideal. I see it· as the least 
bad option available, if somewhat fuaccurate internalized beliefs pre-
serve constraint and candor. In Part III, I discuss the dilemma facing 
legal teachers and scholars if inducing people to hold true beliefs has 
bad consequences. 
In sum, I niake four pointS in this article. Descriptively, i remind 
legal theorists that judges decide in complicated ways that might be 
illuminated by psychological accounts of denial and rationalization, or 
cognitive dissonance, and that might include holding and sustaining 
inaccurate beliefs. Normatively, I argue that judges holding inaccu-
rate beliefs about their decisions might decide better than they would 
with a clearer understanding of their actions. Philosophically, I sug-
gest that if a system including judges who hold inaccurate beliefs has 
sufficient benefits, we should consider carefully whether such a system 
could in principle be justified. Editorially, I point out that by failing to 
consider the benefits of false beliefs, and the difficulty and harm of 
trying to destroy them, critical scholars have advocated imprudent 
tactics given their stated political goals. 
I. Is THE BELIEF IN LAW PARTIALLY SELF-FULFILLING? 
In this Part, I argue that law might constrain more, and judges 
might be more candid, if judges and others believe slightly inaccurate 
or oversimplified accounts of decisionmaking. I also explain how and 
why judges might maintain such beliefs. 
A. Transparent Justification 
Before making these arguments, I should explain a philosophical 
difficulty with the project. Even if I can identify benefits to judges 
holding inaccurate views, and show that attempts to induce judges to 
hold more accurate views would make the world worse, some philoso-
300 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:296 
phers would conclude that I did not justify a method of deciding cases. 
Although my argument might be persuasive, it is not transparent, and 
is therefore unacceptable to them. 
A reason or justification is nontransparent if, when people whose 
behavior it concerns accept it, they become less able to act in the way 
that the reason justifies.10 By contrast, a transparent reason or justifi-
cation will not induce people whose behavior it justifies, if they come 
to accept it, to act less justifiably in the justification's own terms.11 
The following story illustrates this distinction: 
Anne was lost in the woods, and crying for her parents. "Stay here,'' I 
told her, as I set off to find them. I soon discovered another child 
(dressed just like Anne) screaming in pain. A tree had fallen on her legs. 
I couldn't lift the tree. So I went to look for help. 
A man and woman appeared, and I motioned for them to follow me 
to the fallen tree. They stopped, hurriedly told me about their daughter 
Anne, and asked me why they should follow. 
Two responses came to mind: first, a child is hurt and needs help; 
second, their daughter is safe and nearby, so they need not ignore the 
first reason as less important than their own concerns. But before I 
could offer these reasons, I remembered the huge tree, and realized that 
it was too large even for three to lift. I despaired of finding any reason 
for them to follow. 
Suddenly an idea came to me. I had read that parents afraid for their 
children's welfare sometimes perform otherwise impossible acts of 
strength. Perhaps we could help the child if the couple mistakenly be-
lieved that Anne was beneath the tree. So I decided that the couple 
should help me for a third reason: they could save a suffering child using 
the strength brought on by their false belief that the child under the tree 
was Anne. Of course, I could not tell them the third reason, because 
informing them that their false belief made them useful would have de-
prived them of the very strength that enabled them to help. 
The third reason in this story is nontransparent because convincing 
10. I do not enter the debate on the philosophical question "what is a justification?" Some 
writers contend that the purpose of justification is to convince. If a reason is nontransparent, it 
cannot justify. See, e.g., J. EI.STER, SOUR GRAPES 91 (1983). Derek Parfit takes the opposite 
position: 
It is not the aim of a theory to be believed[,] •.. but to be true, or to be the best theory •••• 
. . . If the best theory was [nontransparent], telling us to believe some other theory, the 
truth about rationality would be depressingly convoluted. It is natural to hope that the 
truth is simpler: that the best theory would tell us to believe itself. But can this be more 
than a hope? Can we assume that the truth must be simpler? We cannot. 
D. PARFIT, REAsONS AND PERSONS 24 (1984) (emphasis in original). Without offering new 
arguments, I adopt Parfit's position in this article. 
11. This use of the term "transparency" follows Bernard Williams. See B. WILLIAMS, E111-
1cs AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 101-10 (1985) (explaining why some forms of utilitarian-
ism are not transparent, and identifying both Sidgwick and Hare as "Government House 
Utilitarians" who support nontransparent theories). 
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the couple to use the strength brought on by their mistake would have 
incapacitated them from helping. 
Some philosophers believe that any legitimate justification must be 
transparent.12 Most legal philosophers agree. Justifications of judging 
have always presumed that judges can and should believe the 
justification.13 
In this article, I explore a contrary view.14 Only a nontransparent 
12. S. BOK, LYING 97-98 (1978); J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM FOR AND 
AGAINST 123, 139 (1973); B. WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 101-02; Devine, The Conscious Accept-
ance of Guilt in the Necessary Murder, 89 ETHICS 221, 223-24 (1979); see J. ELSTER, supra note 
10, at 91-100 (noting that for some political institutions, their main benefits, as seen ex post, are 
by-products that cannot be achieved if they are consciously aimed at by the members of a society, 
and citing Tocqueville's Democracy in America as an attempt to evaluate institutions in this way). 
Elster seems, however, to reject such benefits as possible justifications because "constitution-
makers ••• cannot coherently invoke them in public." Id. at 92. Elster elsewhere call this 
"excess of will." See J. ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS 18-20 (1989). Rawls and Bister attri-
bute insistence on transparency to Kant. See J. ELSTER, supra note 10, at 92; J. RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 133 & n.8 (1971). Transparency is not valued only by liberals, but by many 
radicals as well. B. WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 101; see, e.g., R. GEUSS, supra note 8, at 63-75. 
Rawls' publicity requirement includes transparency. Public justification must in fact be 
known or knowable by all members of a just society. See J. RAWLS, supra, at 133 ("They sup-
pose that everyone will know about these principles all that he would know if their acceptance 
were the result of an agreement."); id. at 581. 
13. The closest legal theorists have come to endorsing judicial delusion was the early writing 
on legal fictions. See, e.g., H. v AHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF "As IF" (C. Ogden trans. 1924). 
Vahinger notes that many disciplines, including law, rely on fictions - or acting "as if" some-
thing known to be false were true. He saw that it is a nearly universal human tendency, in order 
to acquire the benefit of those fictions with a minimum of psychological stress, actually to come 
to believe them. This process Vahinger called an ideational shift from fiction to dogma. Id. at 
124-34. Despite noticing the importance of fictions, and noticing that they are very difficult to 
use without coming to believe them, Vahinger maintained that accepting the fictions as true was 
a weakness that would eventually be overcome. Id. at 132, Therefore, despite identifying many 
benefits of what I call nontransparency, Vahinger never came to accept it as a justification. See 
Samek, Fictions and the Law, 31 U. TORONTO L.J. 290 (1981) (discussing Bentham's, Vahinger's, 
and Fuller's accounts of legal fictions). 
Fuller attributes to Vahinger a strong admiration for the benefits of mistaken thought. See L. 
FuLLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 118 (1967) ("Vahinger likens thought to the process of walking. 
Walking consists in a series of falls, each arresting and compensating the other just in time. So 
thinking consists in a series of mutually opposed mistakes."). 
Martin Shapiro has suggested that even if the Supreme Court is engaged in discretionary 
political activity, it should not necessarily say so in public: "It would be fantastic indeed if the 
Supreme Court, in the name of sound scholarship, were to disavow publicly the myth upon 
which its power rests." M. SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 27. Because Shapiro does not make clear 
whether he wants the Court to lie, or not to become aware of its own manipulation, I cannot say 
whether he supports a nontransparent theory, or one that is truly nonpublic. See infra note 16. 
14. Some support for nontransparent justification appears in legal and philosophical litera-
ture. See D. PARFIT, supra note 10, at 3-49 (Acknowledging that transparency is desirable, but 
that the best theories of morality and rationality might be such that their goals will be best 
achieved if people aim at something besides the goals dictated by the theory. When this is true, 
he calls a theory "indirectly self-defeating."); Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: 
On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 91 HARV. L. REv. 625 (1984) (suggesting acoustic 
separation between how the criminal laws operate, and how most people believe they operate); G. 
CALABRESI & P. BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 20-28, 50, 78-79, 134 (1978); G. CALABRESI, IDE-
ALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND THE LAW (1985); H. SlDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 413 
(1962); J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 50-53; Alexander, Pursuing the good -
Indirectly, 95 ETHICS 315 (1985); Harrison & Mashburn, Jean-Luc Godard and Critical Legal 
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justification can ·support the position that judges should hold inaccu-
rate beliefs about their roles. My justification approves behavior such 
as denial, which, like strength induced by error, works best if the indi-
vidual can avoid noticing that she is doing it. 15 Judges might be dis-
. abled by complete understanding of their acts, in much the way 
Anne's parents would have been. 
By considering whether judges should hold inaccurate beliefs, I do 
not suggest that we should abandon a requirement related to trans-
parency that is sometimes called publicity: justifications must be ac-
ceptable to any rational individual as a reason for action.16 The 
justification I offer is public in this sense. It could be offered to and 
accepted by any rational individual, including a judge. Nontranspar-
ent justifications must not be offered in some circumstances because 
they might be accepted and therefore self-defeat. 
I do not support anything like Plato's noble lie.17 Plato advocated 
leading people to have false views of their origin to justify class distinc-
tions. His lie was not public in the sense that it would not be accepta-
ble to those deceived. Further, I do not advocate actively trying to 
deceive judges. I suggest only that we should not try to induce them 
to introspect. 
I also do not argue that judges should avoid self-conscious deci-
sionmaking. Self-consciousness means having and trying to use a the-
ory about the nature of one's actions. Nonself-conscious judging 
would demand that judges simply decide cases without holding any 
view about how they should decide. Indeed, some critics do seem to 
believe that judges need no theory of decisionmaking, either because 
theory is unrelated to practice, or because judicial decisionmaking is 
Studies (Because We Need the Eggs), 87 MICH. L. REV. 1924 (1989); Railton, Alienation, Conse-
quentialism, and the Demands of Morality, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 134 (1984); Waldron, Particu-
lar Values and Critical Morality, 11 CALIF. L. REV. 561, 566 n.15 (1989) (quoting A. SMITH, AN 
INQUIRY INTO TIIE NATURE AND CAUSES OF TIIE WEALTII OF NATIONS 456 (R, Campbell & 
A. Skinner eds. 1976)) ("By pursuing his own interest [the individual] frequently promotes that 
of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it."); Weyrauch, Law as 
Mask-Legal Ritual and Relevance, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 699 (1979); cf. D. HUME, AN ENQUIRY 
CoNCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 118 (Open Court Publishing Co. ed. 1953) (1777) 
(The "truth of any proposition by no means depends on its tendency to promote the interests of 
society; yet a man has but a bad grace, who delivers a theory, however true, which, he must 
confess, leads to a practice dangerous and pernicious .••• Why dig up the pestilence from the pit 
in which it is buried?"). 
15. See supra note 7. 
16. See. e.g., S. BoK, supra note 12, at 105-06. Nietzsche is often cited as among the only 
thinkers to reject even this minimal requirement for publicity, because he suggested that some 
people need not be offered justifications. See Gaus, Subjective Value and Justificatory Political 
Theory, in JUSTIFICATION: NoMos XXVIII 241, 255-58 (1986). Rawls' notion of publicity in-
cludes both publicity in Bok's terms and transparency as I am using the term. See J. RAWLS, 
supra note 12, at 133. 
17. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC *414b. 
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nothing but an exercise in power that could not be affected by theories 
held by judges.18 · 
I hold the opposite view. Judges should be self-conscious. They 
do and ought to have views about their roles as judges. These theories 
affect their decisions. Opposing introspection means only that these 
role conceptions need not always be consistent with a perfectly accu-
rate view of a judge's own mental process. . 
B. · Partially Self-Fulfilling Beliefs 
Some critics contend that law constrains judges little or not at all. 
Rules already announced limit a judge's decision no more than if the 
relevant rule were "do as you like."19 This position presupposes the 
radical indeterminacy of both rules and higher order legal values. 
Rather than rehearse all the arguments against indeterminacy,20 I 
argue here that certain judicial failures to introspect might help make 
law more constraining, because the belief in law is partially self-fulfil-
ling. 21 By "partially self-fulfilling," I mean something that is false, but 
that becomes closer to being true because people believe it. 22 
I argue that law becomes more or less constraining depending on 
individual judges' beliefs about law, judges' role conceptions, and ex-
18. See, e.g., s. FlsH, DOING WHAT CoMES NATURALLY 465 (1989) (arguing that "[t]he 
removal of critical self-consciousness from the list of possible ways of acting does not deprive 
anyone of anything"). · 
19. See, e.g., Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neu-
tral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781, 819 n.119 (1983). · 
20. See, e.g., Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 11 CALIP. L. REv. 283 (1989); Schauer, Easy 
Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985); Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical 
Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987). 
21. For accounts of self-fulfilling beliefs, see S. BRAMS, PARADOXES IN PoLmcs 53-77 
(1976); SELF-DEFEATING BEHAVIORS (R. Curtis ed. 1989); J. ELSTER,. ULYSSES AND THE SI-
RENS 106 (1984); R. JONES, SELP-Ful.PILLING PROPHECIES (1977); R... MERTON, SOCIAL THE-
ORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 421-36 (1957); R. ROSENTHAL & L. JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN 
THE CLAssROOM (1968); Berger, Connor & McKeown, Evaluations and the Formation and 
Maintenance of Performance Expectations, in EXPECTATION STATES THEORY 27 (J. Berger, T. 
Connor & M. Pisek eds. 1974); Krishna, "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy" and the Nature of Soci-
ety, 36 AM. Soc. REv. 1104 (1971); Watzlawick, Self-Fulfilling Prophecies, in THE 'INvENTEo 
REALITY 95 (P. Watzlawick ed. 1984). 
In response to realist attacks on determinacy, some writers have suggested that these attacks 
could be self-fulfilling. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 84 (1962); F. 
HAYEK, THE CoNSTITUTION OP LIBERTY 206 (1960) ("If the ideal of the rule of law is a firm 
element of public opinion, legislation and jurisdiction will tend to approach it more and more 
closely. But if it is represented as an impracticable and even undesirable ideal and people cease 
to strive for its realization, it will rapidly disappear."). 
22. Some people have suggested that individual beliefs about the likelihood of a marriage 
surviving are partially self-fulfilling. See, e.g., G. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 224-25 
(1981); cf. J. ELSTER, supra note 10, at 7. I expect that there are some ~tates of the world that 
can only, or at least most easily, be brought about by many people believing that the world is 
something like, but not exactly like, it is. If so, then partially self-fulfilling beliefs might be 
(nontransparently) justified as needed to bring about such states of affairs •. 
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pectations about Jaw held by observers in various positions of power. I 
find that judges who believe law can and should constrain are more 
constrained by law than judges who do not think law should constrain, 
though less than the first group believes they are constrained. Belief in 
law is thus somewhat self-fulfilling. Nonintrospection might make law 
more effective, because the judicial beliefs and role conceptions that 
permit law to constrain most effectively are not completely accurate. 23 
I suggest that judges follow rules and implement principles in part 
because they believe that they can and should do so, that they might 
overestimate the frequency with which this is possible, that this over-
estimation increases the chance that law constrains judges, and that a 
clearer understanding could decrease constraint and candor. First, 
however, I explain why judges might hold such false beliefs, how they 
sustain them, and why these beliefs affect behavior. 
1. The Psychology of Self-Fulfilling Beliefs 
People sometimes fail to notice that their desires and behavior do 
not match their ideals. Psychoanalysts call the mental mechanisms 
that permit this defenses. 24 Cognitive theorists talk of dissonance re-
duction.25 Despite important disagreements among members of these 
schools, they agree that people tend to find strategies to avoid examin-
23. There is currently a debate as to whether public choice interpretations of legislation 
should be stated in public. This debate mirrors the question I address in this paper. See, e.g., 
Brennan & Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case/or the "Nobel" Lie, 14 VA. L. REV. 
179, 185-86 (1988) ("As scientists, we consider it our purpose to destroy myths. But we should 
recognize that the 'myths of democracy' may be essential to ••• stable political order."); Kelman, 
"Public Choice" and Public Spirit, 87 PUB. INTERESI' 80, 93-94 (1987) ("Cynical descriptive 
conclusions about behavior in government threaten to undermine the norm prescribing public 
spirit. The cynicism of journalists - and even the writings of professors - can decrease public 
spirit simply by describing what they claim to be its absence. Cynics are therefore in the business 
of making prophesies that threaten to become self-fulfilling • • • • That is the tragedy of public 
choice."); Mashaw, The Economies of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 Cm.-
KENT L. REV. 123 (1989). 
24. See, e.g., A. FREUD, THE EGo AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE (1966); J, SANDLER 
& A. FREUD, THE ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE: THE EGo AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE 
REVISITED (1985); N. HAAN, CoPING AND DEFENDING: PROCESSES OF SELF-ENVIRONMENT 
ORGANIZATION (1977). Many scholars have suggested that judging can be understood in psy-
choanalytic terms. See, e.g .• A. EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1971); J. 
FRANK, supra note 1; A. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHI· 
ATRY AND LAW (1967); H. LASWELL, POWER AND PERSONALITY 65-88 (1948) (psychoana-
lyzing three judges); c. SCHOENFELD, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE LAW (1973); A. WATSON, 
PSYCHIATRY FOR LA WYERS 129, 133, 187 (1968); Ormrod, Judges and the Processes of Judging, 
in JUBILEE LECTURES CELEBRATING THE FOUNDATION OF THE FACULTY OF LAW, UNIVER· 
SITY OF BIRMINGHAM 181 (1981); Schroeder, The Psychoanalytic Study of Judicial Opinions, 6 
CALIF. L. REV. 89 (1918); Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of the Trial Judge's Decision 
Making, 39 MERCER L. REv. 937 (1988); Winick, Gerver & Blumberg, The Psychology of 
Judges, in LEGAL AND CRIMINAL PSYCHOLOGY 121, 136-38 (H. Toch ed. 1961). 
25. See, e.g .• L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNmVE DISSONANCE (1957); R. WICKLUND 
& J. BREHM, PERSPECTIVES ON COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1976). 
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ing internal conflicts and unpleasant facts. By invoking these theories, 
I do not mean to suggest that all or even much of judicial behavior is 
best understood in these terms. I suggest only that ego defense, disso-
nance reduction, or some other means of avoiding conflicts plays a role 
in legal decisionmaking. 26 
Psychoanalytic theory supposes that people defend against un-
pleasurable affect caused by internal conflict. 27 Some recent theory 
suggests that defenses are used to reduce conflict, whatever its source, 
including defending against superego demands and prohibitions.28 
Accordingly, judges might fail to notice aspects of their jobs as a 
means of reducing guilt or shame when they do not meet moral de-
mands they place on themselves. In psychoanalytic terms, two ways 
of not noticing - denial and repression - and three tactics for facili-
tating this failure to notice - rationalization, projection, and splitting 
- could help explain how and why judges avoid introspection. 29 
26. On the importance of avoiding explanations of judicial behavior that rely on few vari-
ables, and the need for more complex theories, see Gibson, From Simplicity to Complexity: The 
Development of Theory in the Study of Judicial Behavior, S POL. BEHA v. 7 (1983). 
27. See, e.g., C. BRENNER, THE MIND JN CoNFLicr 72 (1982). Traditionally, psychoana-
lysts thought that people defended only against conflict caused by unacceptable drive derivatives. 
See A. FREUD, supra note 24, at S8. 
28. C. BRENNER, supra note 27, at SS, 7S; Wallerstein, Defenses, Defense Mechanisms, and 
the Structure of the Mind, in DEFENSE AND REsISTANCE 201, 223 (H. Blum ed. 198S). 
29. See C. BRENNER, supra note 27, at 120. Denial means "distortion of one's perception of 
.•• external reality." Id. at 77. Judges might fail to become aware of some aspects of their 
decisionmaking process, such as the extent to which they manipulate precedents and facts. De-
nial often refers only to gross distortions of perception. See L. SCHILLING, PERSPECTIVES ON 
CoUNSELING THEORIES 31 (1984). I have in mind, however, a more subtle failure to notice 
one's own process of decision. See Willick, On the Concept of Primitive Defenses, in DEFENSE 
AND REsISTANCE, supra note 28, at 17S, 194. 
Repression is failing to become aware of one's own motivations or impulses. See G. SWAN· 
SON, EGo DEFENSES AND TIIE LEGmMATION OF BEHAVIOR 116 (1988). Judges might repress 
to avoid noticing that they are sometimes motivated by moral and political views of their own, or 
by prejudices and sympathies, that they believe should not motivate them. 
Rationalization entails offering a faulty, but somewhat plausible, account of why one is not 
motivated by an illicit drive, or engaged in an unacceptable activity, to avoid noticing that one is 
indeed doing the prohibited thing. See id. at 108. Some of the discussion in judicial opinions can 
be understood as rationalization. See J. FRANK, supra note 1, at 134-37; C. SCHOENFELD, supra 
note 24, at 77-79; Schroeder, supra note 24, at 93-9S; Watson, supra note 24, at 948. 
Projection is "[a] process by which an objectionable, internal tendency is unrealistically at-
tributed to another person or persons ... instead of being recognized as a part of one's self." G. 
SWANSON, supra, at lOS. Some opinions attribute difficult decisions to the legislature, or to 
precedent, when it is clear that the judge had power to decide either way. This process can be 
understood as an attempt to avoid feeling responsible by attributing the decision to someone or 
something else. See C. SCHOENFELD, supra note 24, at 82; Watson, supra note 24, at 9S7; cf R. 
CoVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 236-38 (197S) (discussing the false attribution of power to other au-
thorities as a way some judges have decreased dissonance). 
Splitting means stark separation of people and things into good and evil. See, e.g., M. KLEIN, 
ENVY AND GRATITUDE AND OrHER WORKS 1946-1963, at 1-24 (M. Khan ed. 197S). Although 
psychiatrists usually refer to splitting as a primitive defense typical of people with borderline 
personality disorders, there seems to be a common and much less dramatic defense in which 
people avoid noticing moral complexity that threatens their own simple moral views. Instead 
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I suggest that judges .use these tactics to avoid internal conflicts, 
and to avoid noticing disturbing facts about themselves and about the 
world. 30 Taking responsibility for difficult and important decisions 
and acknowledging moral complexity is often unpleasant. 
My argument that belief in following law is somewhat self-fulfilling 
can invoke theories of defense. Ego defenses affect more than mental 
processes; they alter behavior.31 If superego demands and other con-
flicts lead judges to defend, such conflicts might also lead judges to 
decide differently.32 Judges accept an obligation to follow law. If they 
cannot always do so, defenses might permit them not to notice some of 
their failures to meet their ego ideal. Judges using these defenses 
might be more constrained by law than judges who are more conscious 
of failures to meet their ego ideal. Although an introspective judge 
might more flexibly choose when to follow law, I argue that problems 
such as weakness of will and other cognitive difficulties might lead an 
introspective judge to ignore law more often and in less desirable 
circumstances. 
A parallel argument can be made using the language of cognitive 
dissonance. 33 The standard account of cognitive dissonance is that no-
ticing how two cognitions conflict makes us uncomfortable. 34 Some 
recent interpretations focus on dissonance caused by conflicting im-
pressions of the self, including noticing that one's behavior does not 
match one's self-image.35 If the gap between a person's perceptions of 
they simplify the situation to one obviously right position and one obviously wrong position. See 
generally D. LEVINE, THE FLIGHT FROM AMBIGUITY 12-13, 33 (1985); J. LoEVINGER & R. 
WESSLER, MEAsURING EGo DEVELOPMENT (Jessey-Bass Behavioral Science Series 1, 1970). 
Legal doctrine, especially when it takes the form of rules, might facilitate a mild form of splitting. 
Consider how many times you have read a decision in which each of the applicable factors mirac-
ulously counsels ruling in favor of the winning party, or in which the judge need not select 
among competing rules, because the same party wins under all possible rules. Most judicial 
opinions are written as if the outcome were obvious, never permitting doubt or moral difficulty to 
appear. These rhetorical devices reinforce the tendency to avoid moral complexity. Applying 
rules requires reduction of complex situations into clear decisions. Some judges go far beyond 
the necessary simplifications when they apply rules. 
30. See M. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A Jusr WORLD 20-21 (1980). 
31. See, e.g., Wallerstein, supra note 28, at 205-08. 
32. See, e.g., C. BRENNER, supra note 27, at 216-21 (connecting defense against superego 
demands with charitable behavior). 
33. Robert Cover offers a cognitive dissonance theory of the behavior of some judges who 
decided fugitive slave cases. See R. CoVER, supra note 29, at 226-38. 
34. L. FE.sTINGER, supra note 25, at 3; see also R. WICKLUND & J. BREHM, supra note 25. 
For recent literature reviews, see Cialdidi, Petty & Cacioppo, Attitudes and Attitude Change, 32 
ANN. REv. PSYCHOLOGY 357 (1981); Cooper & Croyle, Attitudes and Attitude Change, 35 ANN. 
REV. PSYCHOLOGY 395 (1984). 
35. In this respect, some modern dissonance theory is becoming more like ego-defense the-
ory. See, e.g., Greenwald & Ronis, Twenty Years of Cognitive Dissonance: Case Study of the 
Evolution of a Theory, 85 PSYCHOLOGICAL REv. 53, 55 (1978); Steele & Lui, Dissonance 
Processes as Self-Affirmation, 45 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 5 (1983). 
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her behavior and her ideals is large enough, creating sufficient discom-
fort, she will be motivated to reduce the discomfort using any of a 
number of tactics, three of which seem to me especially relevant: 
changing one's behavior to meet the ideal;36 changing one's percep-
tions of the behavior so that it seems to meet the ideal;37 and altering 
the ideal so that one's behavior now conforms to it.38 
Introspection might make judges uncomfortable. Cognitive disso-
nance theory explains why judges might mistakenly believe they suc-
ceed more often than they do: they have altered their perceptions of 
their activities to reduce the discomfort of failing to meet their ideals. 
The theory also explains why judges might be more constrained if they 
believe in the possibility and desirability of constraint: ignoring law 
too often or too blatantly would create discomfort. So they may alter 
their behavior to conform more closely to their ideals. Finally, disso-
nance theory explains why revealing the extent to which judges fail at 
their goals seems risky: if modifying their behavior or their percep-
tions of their behavior is difficult, they might alter their ideals to some-
thing more regularly possible, but less desirable. 
2. Whether Constraint Varies with Beliefs 
In this section, I explain how judges' different beliefs might affect 
the extent to which law constrains them. 39 By constrained, I do not 
mean compelled to reach a particular outcome; rather, I mean only 
prevented from reaching some outcome that a judge prefers. Judges 
could never be entirely unconstrained. All judges are limited in what 
they can do by many forces, only one of which is law. Judges must 
build consensus on collegial courts, avoid being reversed, escape undue 
social pressure from the public, and perform a wide variety of other 
tasks that limit their decisions. Further, law to some extent constrains 
judges no matter what they believe. The question I discuss is whether 
marginal changes in law's constraint depend on individual judges' 
beliefs. 
To see how law constrains judges regardless of the beliefs they 
36. R. WICKLUND & J. BREHM, supra note 25, at 132-34. 
37. Id. at 5. 
38. Id. 
39. Anthony D'Amato has suggested that what legal theories judges believe can affect how 
constrained the judges are. See D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of 
Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REV. 561, 564 (1989); see also R. KEETON, JUDGING 13 (1990) ("The pro-
fessional commitment of the judge - what the judge believes about what he or she is doing -
makes a difference. If any judge believes with the cynics that reasons for decisions are different 
from those publicly stated - as some judges have occasionally proclaimed - the potential con-
tributions of that judge to justice are in some degree limited ••.. "). 
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hold, consider a judge who views his own role as that of political ac-
tivist: "someone with the 'vocation of social transformation.' "40 
Duncan Kennedy offers such an account.41 He imagines himself a fed-
eral district judge confronting a case that initially presents a conflict 
between the law and how he wants to come out.4Z Kennedy decides to 
try justifying the outcome he prefers. 43 He finds that law constrains 
what he can do: "Law constrains as a physical medium constrains -
you can't do absolutely anything you want with a pile of bricks, and 
what you can do depends on how many you have, as well as on your 
other circumstances. "44 
Kennedy believes law constrains for several reasons, including that 
judges view themselves as having promised the public to follow the 
law, which they at least must view as an obligation to offer a good 
legal argument.45 Sometimes it is simply more difficult to construct 
any argument that will seem plausible for ruling in the way you want 
that accords with widely held views about how judges should decide 
cases. This will depend on the configuration of the field - on how 
impacted it is. 46 
Kennedy as a judge resembles Houdini.47 Rules bind like ropes 
40. Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 518, 521 (1986); see also Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 
Omo ST. LJ. 412, 424-25 (1981). A revised version of Kennedy's article was published as Ken-
nedy, Toward a Critical Phenomenology of Judging, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOL· 
OGY 141 (A. Hutchinson & P. Monahan eds. 1987). 
41. See Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, supra 
note 40, at 521. 
42. By this Kennedy says he means that he initially believes that the rule was clearly in-
tended to govern cases exactly like this one, and that he thinks others will share this impression. 
Id. at 518-19. 
43. Having to work to achieve an outcome is in my view fundamental to the situation of 
the judge .•.• [Y]ou could say that the judge is both free and bound - free to work in any 
direction but limited by the pseudo-objectivity of the rule-as-applied, which he may or may 
not be able to overcome. 
Id. at 522. 
44. Id. at 526. 
45. Other constraining factors include: judges seek community approval, or at least want to 
avoid being accused of having broken that promise; judges do not want to be reversed; judges 
want to influence others; judges want to maintain credibility so as to be able to continue their 
work in other cases; and judges like to see how their moral views translate into legal terms. Id. at 
527-28. 
46. By impacted, Kennedy means presenting itself as "highly organized" and presenting an 
"image oflegal necessity" in which cases each "refer[] in [their] holding[s] to the other cases and 
indicat[e] how the gaps between the cases should be filled." Kennedy, Toward a Critical Phe-
nomenology of Judging, supra note 40, at 153. See also Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in 
Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, supra note 40, at 538-39. It will also depend on how 
smart, and how busy the judge is at the time, how strongly she feels that the apparent application 
of the rule is wrong (and therefore how much risk of humiliation she is willing to risk and how 
much political capital she is willing to expend) as well as the political climate at the time of the 
ruling. 
47. A number of judges have adopted "Houdini" as an epithet for other judges who manipu-
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bind. Sometimes the ropes are so tight that a judge cannot escape 
them. Sometimes the ropes are such that it depends how skillful the 
judge is at trying to escape, and how much time and energy the judge 
cares to devote. Sometimes the judge does not care to escape - in 
which case she can simply explain that she is bound. The judge is an 
escape artist politicized. 48 
Law constrains Houdini not because he believes that it is a reason 
for his decisions. Rather, it constrains him in large part because many 
other people whose respect he needs believe that judges can and 
should follow rules, and discover values in prior cases, without being 
influenced (too much) by their own political views. As a result, Hou-
dini will not always be able to generate arguments that others will 
regard as good, or even minimally acceptable, for reaching a particular 
result. All judges are constrained by the need to appear to follow 
rules, or discover values, as other people understand rule following, 
and value discovery. 
In the remainder of this section, I argue that law constrains Hou-
dini less than it does other judges because of Houdini's attitude toward 
following rules. I must therefore first define "following a rule."49 Fol-
late precedent inappropriately. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 222 (1979) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[B]y a tour de force reminiscent not of jurists such as Hale, Holmes, 
and Hughes, but of escape artists such as Houdini, the Court eludes clear statutory language, 
'uncontradicted' legislative history, and uniform precedent • • . ."); Pasco Terminals, Inc. v. 
United States, 567 F.2d 976, 979 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (Miller, J., concurring) (accusing the majority 
of escaping from reality "with the wizardry of a Houdini"); First Natl. Bank of Md. v. Burton, 
Parsons & Co., 57 Md. App. 437, 450, 470 A.2d 822, 829 (1984) ("Such a task requires more 
than a mere factfinder; it requires a Houdini or soothsayer. Courts should confine themselves to 
the law, not enter the realm of thaumatology."); Jonaitis v. State, 437 N.E.2d 140, 145 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1982) (Staton, J., dissenting) ("The Majority's reference ..• is nothing more than a decoy 
to mask the Majority's Houdini-like manipulation of the unambiguous terms of the Juvenile 
Code."); State v. Reeves, 427 So. 2d 403, 427 (La. 1982) (Dixon, C.J., dissenting) ("Like a blind-
folded Houdini, the majority opinion writer eludes uncontradicted convention history, wiggles 
free of plain words in the constitution and discovers a gap in the document no other scholar 
knew existed .•.. ");Pin Pin H. Su v. Kemper Ins. Cos./ American Motorists Ins. Co., 431 A.2d 
416, 420 (R.I. 1981) (Kelleher, J., dissenting) ("Houdini would certainly appreciate such 'sleight 
of eye.' •• .''). 
48. My discussion of Houdini caricatures Kennedy's position. Kennedy notes that how he 
wants to come out may change once he starts reading cases, not just because the cases prove hard 
to manipulate, but also because the cases convince him. See Kennedy, Toward a Critical Phe-
nomenology of Judging, supra note 40, at 157-61. I agree with Kennedy that even the most 
manipulative judge will be subject to such conversion, and indeed that judges' initial impressions 
of how they want to decide are already influenced by having read cases on the subject. Id. at 157. 
I ignore this important factor in describing Houdini, because if Houdini, who did not allow 
himself to be convinced by the normative power of the field is constrained, a fortiori, so will any 
real judge be constrained. As well, I do not consider being convinced that one's initial preference 
was wrong as being constrained by law. 
49. I do not commit myself to any notion of the literal meaning of rules apart from acts of 
interpretation. Rather, I only claim that if at a moment, in a particular context, judges anticipate 
that most people (or most people whose opinions matter to them) will agree that deciding one 
way is following a rule and deciding the other way is breaking a rule, then most judges will be 
more likely than Houdini to decide in accordance with that anticipated consensus. 
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lowing a rule consists in finding some general description of circum-
stances contained in an authoritative source, and then, if the 
circumstances fit the general description, doing what the source says 
to do. 
These acts demand that one actually can decide when specific facts 
exist, when those facts are examples of a general category, and what 
the general category is. Each of these steps is problematic. Even when 
they seem noncontroversial, explaining why they were easy has itself 
been difficult. Nonetheless, in particular communities, at specific 
times, some actions are uncontroversial examples of following rules. 
Many factors make it possible sometimes to agree about general cate-
gories, specific facts, and how they connect. People who reach such 
agreement share contingent but stable cultural, linguistic, biological 
and social characteristics. We share some beliefs, values, and 
understandings. 
Among these common factors is a shared understanding of rule 
following. We disagree over important details, such as whether to 
consider the intent of rule makers, or the meaning of the words they 
use, when they seem to diverge. Still, we largely agree about broad 
outlines. We assume that a rule was developed by people much like 
us, who had some purpose in mind that we can and were meant to 
understand, that they used words in the ways usual among the people 
to whom the rule is addressed, and that they made the rule knowing 
that it would need to be interpreted by people who shared these 
assumptions. 
Additionally, both followers and makers of rules assume that peo-
ple trying to follow a rule will be engaged in a sincere attempt to deter-
mine something about its intended application. We disagree about 
whether interpretation involves asking what sorts of situations the ac-
tual rule makers had in mind, or whether we should consider what 
situations reasonable makers of such a rule could have had in mind for 
it to govern, or whether we should consider the reasons they might 
have had for enacting it. But we agree that rule following involves 
making a sincere effort to answer some such question. I do not pre-
sume that this is possible. Nevertheless, consensus about when a rule 
applies is facilitated by the fact that people sincerely make this at-
tempt, and expect that others will as well. 
Houdini falsifies these assumptions. He does not try to follow 
rules. He sees decisionmaking as a tactical game, the point of which is 
to pursue his own goals, whether or not he believes that the rule can be 
most reasonably understood that way. He does not care whether most 
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other people would interpret it this way. The only check on his inter-
pretation game is whether he can get away with implementing his 
goals.so 
Houdini is willing to manipulate. By manipulation, I mean inten-
tionally ignoring what one believes to be the most convincing argu-
ment and instead offering legal arguments that one believes to be less 
strong, while failing to disclose one's reasons for doing so.s1 Houdini 
will pretend that he is engaged in an attempt to follow rules, and that 
he is not ignoring the purpose of the statute or its most natural inter-
pretation. In an effort to win, he will misrepresent his motives for 
decision and his opinion about what legal arguments seem to him most 
convincing. 
When Houdini does not like a rule that seems to control a case, he 
tries to write an opinion distinguishing the apparently governing rule, 
or finding an exception to the rule that will seem at least minimally 
acceptable to others whose respect he needs. Nothing save for time, 
intellect, and other job and life pressures will keep Houdini from this 
work. Houdini's role conception does not forbid manipulation to 
achieve political goals .. If Houdini notices that he is manipulating, he 
will not lose self-esteem. 
Houdini's manipulation should not be confused with other activi-
ties, such as careful thinking or candid activism. A very careful judge 
might believe that her task is to follow the law. She never decides a 
case until she has considered all possible arguments, including the ar-
guments that Houdini will often use to manipulate. Sometimes she 
will be convinced by an argument that upon first inspection seemed 
unappealing. She differs from Houdini, however, both because she 
feels obligated to follow the law when she thinks it wrong, and because 
she feels obligated candidly to offer the reasons that convince her. 
An activist judge might believe that the goal of judging is to do 
what is best for the world in every case, and that she must consult her 
own moral vision in order to do so. Like Houdini, she does not have 
the goal of trying to follow law. Unlike Houdini, however, she be-
lieves that she is obligated always to disclose exactly why she is decid-
ing a case. If she comes upon a rule or principle that she thinks 
nonideal, she says so. She offers moral reasons in her opinions for 
SO. Of course, Houdini cares how other judges interpret in the sense that he must consider 
how others, including reviewing judges, will react to his decisions. But he cares about con-
forming with other people's view of following_ law only in this instrumental sense. 
51. I do not count as manipulation writing an opinion offering reasons that one finds less 
than compelling in order to obtain a majority on a collegial court. I agree with David Shapiro 
that not expressing all one believes in order to obtain a majority does not necessarily compromise 
candor. See D. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 736, 742-43. 
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ignoring rules, ot overturning them, or creating exceptions. Candid 
activism is not manipulation. 52 
By saying that Houdini will follow rules less often than other 
judges, I mean that in cases in which almost all who view their task as 
trying to apply rules would agree about what a rule requires (despite 
varying moral views, and views of the wisdom of the rule or its pur-
pose), Houdini will less often reach that result when he thinks he can 
get away with it. He will still sometimes follow rules because he 
agrees with them, because he cannot invent a way to manipulate the 
rule, or because he thinks that the risk of manipulation is not worth 
the harm of being seen as a Houdini. 
Judges with other role conceptions will be more constrained. 53 If 
they see themselves as more politically neutral than Houdini, other 
judges will want to act in accordance with their own view of following 
rules or discovering values - which might include not working too 
hard to resolve splits between how the law is and how they would 
prefer it to be. 54 
52. Whether Houdini would be significantly less constrained than a candid activist judge 
seems to me a difficult question. The candid activist need not seek precedent-based arguments, 
which could make her less constrained. However, unless she is a Supreme Court justice, fear of 
reversal could make her more constrained. I offer no further speculation. I point out only that 
activism and manipulation are not the same. Other parts of this article offer some discussion on 
the desirability of a more activist judiciary. See infra section 11.B.4. 
53. The theory that judges' beliefs about their appropriate role affects their decisions has of 
course been a subject of much empirical study since at least the middle 1950s. Because the 
studies cannot easily isolate single factors to determine what affects judicial decision, the results 
are inconclusive. However, a number of studies have found the possibility of some correlation 
between judicial role conceptions and judicial behavior. See J. HOWARD, CoURTS OP APPEALS 
IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SY5fEM 167-88 (1981); Champagne & Nagle, The Psychology of 
Judging, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OP THE CoURTROOM 258, 269 (N. Kerr & R. Bray eds. 1982); 
Danelski, Causes and Consequences of Conflict and its Resolution in the Supreme Court, in JUDI-
CIAL CoNFLICT AND CoNSENSUS 21, 26, 44 (S. Goldman & c. Lamb eds. 1986). Particularly 
supportive of the position that judges who believe in a constrained role will be more constrained 
to decide against their preferences are studies by Theodore Becker. See T. BECKER, PoLmCAL 
BEHAVIORALISM AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE 88-146 (1964); Becker, A Survey Study of Ha-
waiian Judges: The Effects of Judicial Role Variations, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 677, 680 (1966). 
For additional discussion of the effect of judges' beliefs, see Gibson, Judges' Role Orientations, 
Attitudes, and Decisions: An Interactive Model, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 911 (1978); Gibson, The 
Role Concept in Judicial Research, 3 LAW & POLY. Q. 291 (1981). But see Flango & Schubert, 
Two Surveys of Simulated Judicial Decision Making: Hawaii and the Philippines, in CoMPARA· 
TIVE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (G. Schubert & D. Danelski eds. 1969). 
54. See, e.g., Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the ''Politics" of Judging: Dispelling 
Some Myths about the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. CoLO. L. REV. 619 (1985); Rubin, Does Law Matter? 
A Judge's Response to the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 307 (1987). 
Although the public language of judging remains very close to formalism, see Rubin, The 
Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1862-65 (1988), few judges 
are formalists. Surveys of judges suggest that the vast majority believe neither that they should 
implement their moral views whenever the opportunity arises, nor that they should or can always 
avoid doing so, though these surveys surely miss exceptions who do view their role as exercising 
power when they can. 
One study, for example, inquired of federal appellate judges in the Second, Fifth, and D.C. 
Circuits how they felt judges should handle the tension between judicial innovation and the obli-
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Consider two other judges: Hapless, who believes in formalism; 
and Hercules, who agrees with Ronald Dworkin. ss Assume that each 
is confronted with a case that seems to be governed by precedent, but 
whose outcome he dislikes. 
Unlike Houdini, Hapless cannot work directly to avoid a rule. In 
order to get to the answer he wants, Hapless must not only think of an 
acceptable legal argument for the conclusion, he must do so without 
noticing that he is trying to do that at all. If he did notice that he was 
trying to manipulate a rule for political reasons, his own beliefs about 
appropriate behavior would lead him to feel dissonance or guilt, and 
(at least sometimes) to stop. Hapless believes both that he must follow 
what seems to be the best legal argument, and that he should disclose 
the reason for his decision in the opinion. Therefore, if he is to reach 
the decision he likes without perceiving himself to violate his own 
norms, he must engage in the mental contortion of manipulating a rule 
without noticing that he is manipulating the rule (or even that he is 
trying to hide this fact from himself). Imagine being a magician who 
must trick not only the audience but herself as well. This will some-
times prove a hard task. Although people often fail to see the nature 
of their own acts, when manipulation requires great effort, judges who 
cannot direct all their energy toward the task may fail. Hapless might 
therefore, more often than Houdini, give up and "follow the rule" de-
spite disliking the outcome. 
Hercules will also face a problem more difficult than Houdini. 
Hercules can only rule against his impression of the law if he believes 
that the justification he offers really is the one that is most consistent 
with all the other (rightly decided) cases, and with the best theory of 
the law.s6 Hercules' work might be harder than Houdini's, because it 
will involve finding an explanation that both seems acceptable to the 
general legal community and appears to Hercules to be produced by 
the strict requirements of Dworkin's task for Hercules. 
gation to just apply the law. Of the judges who could easily be categorized, about 14% believed 
that they should innovate whenever they were able. Nearly 26% of the judges condemned judi-
cial activism as inappropriate. And about S7% took views between these extremes. See J. How-
ARD, supra note S3, at 160-64. A somewhat similar distribution was found in a study of state 
supreme courts published in 1971. See H. GLICK, SUPREME CoURTS IN STATE PoLmcs 38-S4 
~~ ' 
SS. Dworkin's views have of course changed over the years. Little in the textual discussion 
turns on which of his positions Hercules believes. Generally, Dworkin requires Hercules to de-
cide hard cases by invoking those principles that are most consistent with a theory that explains 
most settled law. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 67-68 (1977); R. DWOR-
KIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 238-40 (1986). 
S6. If the law is immoral enough, Hercules might be able to justify lying. See R. DWORKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note SS, at 326-27; R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 
SS, at 202-06. 
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Some commentators have suggested that Hercules will not be con-
strained by Dworkin's task. They contend that the law is so filled with 
conflicting rules and principles that a sincere Hercules will always be 
able to convince himself that the law is most consistent with the prin-
ciple that allows him to reach his desired result.57 I do not fully agree. 
Although he would sometimes convince himself that the best theory of 
the law incorporates his own moral principles, 58 he will sometimes be 
unable to do so. Despite the conflicting principles present in most ar-
eas of law, often one principle seems to dominate an area, at least for a 
time. When this happens, a sincere Hercules might be unable to con-
vince himself that his favorite contrary principle really best explains 
the most cases. 59 If there are instances in which Houdini can con-
struct an argument from precedent or principle, but Hercules cannot 
generate arguments that he sincerely believes represent the best theory 
of the law - even though he likes the outcome - then Hercules' be-
lief in Dworkin's theory Will have constrained his decision. 
Houdini will follow rules less often than Hapless or Hercules if 
there are any cases in which (1) there is a rule, in the sense that most 
people would agree that a general category is fulfilled under a particu-
lar authority; but (2) it is possible politically and rhetorically to get 
away with a different outcome. It seems likely that some significant 
number of these cases exist. 
One might think that in cases not governed by specific rules, Hou-
dini would be indistinguishable from other judges. If there is no rule 
to follow, Hapless and Hercules cannot follow rules more than Hou-
dini. Yet, when rules run out, law can still constrain. In cases of ad-
mitted rule indeterminacy, Houdini will look to see if he can offer any 
value-based arguments that seem generally acceptable to the public as 
reasons for his desired outcome. If he finds one, he will not be de-
terred from offering it either because these reasons are not the ones 
that convince him, or because he thinks that among the publicly ac-
ceptable arguments these are not the best. 
By contrast, although Hercules and Hapless will also invoke value-
based arguments, they will not offer value-based arguments they do 
57. See A. Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 15 PHIL. & Pun. 
A.FF. 205, 231-32 (1986). 
58. See id. at 230.31. 
59. I recognize that Dworkin's task for Hercules is to find principles that explain the most 
cases in all areas of the law. However, as I assume that this task is impossible even with Hercu-
les's infinite skill, Hercules will be apt to focus on principles embodied in areas of law most 
related to the particular case. At least this is the tendency of real judges and scholars in practice. 
See A. Altman, supra note 57, at 220. Dworkin's theory permits this. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S 
EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 250.54. 
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not sincerely hold as good legal reasons. Hercules, for example, may 
sometimes conclude that the best theory of the law counsels deciding a 
case against his own view of what a prudent decision would require, 
even when no specific rule applies and when he could get away with a 
different decision. 
I have offered some theoretical reasons for thinking Houdini less 
constrained by law than are other judges, both when rules seem, to 
govern a case, and when they do not. Evidence supporting or contra-
dicting my suggestions admittedly is difficult to produce. I cannot 
compare judges who take Houdini's attitude with those who take Hap-
less' attitude to show which group more often follows law. We lack 
access to most if not all judges' beliefs about their own decisions. Fur-
ther, deciding which decisions counted as following law would itself be 
an exercise influenced by the decisions of the researcher. 60 
Several facts nonetheless suggest that role beliefs constrain. First, 
anecdotal evidence supports the conclusion that some judges both do 
not believe that they need to follow rules, and do vote for positions 
that seem to many others to be examples of manipulation. 61 Second, 
although I do not believe everything judges say in opinions, I am in-
clined to think that some significant number of the opinions stating 
"although I personally disagree with the outcome, I feel bound ... " 
are sincere disclosures of the judge's experience of deciding. 62 
Still, some might object, even if judges follow the law in part be-
60. Nevertheless, people do try to engage in this sort of study. See, e.g., Stem, Special Issue.· 
Judging the Judges: The First Two Years of the Reagan Bench, 1 BENCHMARK no. 4-5 (1984). 
This study examined the decisions of all Reagan judicial appointees until 1983. By reading all 
these opinions, and deciding whether each opinion "practiced judicial restraint" the author con-
cluded that the "President has, in general, kept his pledge to appoint men and women to the 
bench who exercise restraint." Id. at 2. This 118-page report did nothing other than look at 
each judge's opinions and express a view as to whether the examiner considered the opinion to be 
restrained. 
61. See, e.g., Karpay, En Banc Furor, Liberal Fury, NEW JERSEY L.J., June 2, 1988, at 10, 
col. 1 (discussing the apparent willingness of some conservative D.C. Circuit judges to decide 
cases according to a political agenda); Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Review, 61 N.C. L. REv. 
29 (1988) (reporting these allegations, and offering evidence that they are accurate but over-
stated, and equally true of liberals and conservatives). 
62. Even a casual computer search of cases containing words such as "Despite my prefer-
ence" or "Although I personally" will tum up many cases in which judges express the view that 
if they could decide unconstrained, they would very much like to vote the other way. See, e.g., 
Gwin v. City of Tallahassee, 132 So. 2d 273, 277 (Fla. 1961) (O'Connell, J., concurring) 
("Although I am personally opposed to participation by government in private enterprise, •.• I 
am forced to agree with the majority opinion because I believe it correctly follows the law of this 
state."). Such comments even appear in dissents, where one would expect not to find judges like 
Houdini making such claims. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 407 So. 2d 595, 600 (Fla. 1981) 
(Overton, J., dissenting) ("Although I personally believe the majority's decision serves the best 
interests of the public and the legal profession, my reading of the cases cited by the majority leads 
me to the legal conclusion that we can regulate ..• but [not] prohibit [the conduct in question]."; 
State v. Frampton, 95 Wash. 2d 469, 513, 627 P.2d 922, 945 (1981) (Stalford, J., dissenting) 
("Although I personally find the thought of death by hanging to be abhorrent, ... I cannot for 
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cause they need to maintain views of themselves as constrained, actual 
constraint requires that judges' beliefs about what the law requires 
sometimes differ from how they want to decide. Many judges will 
view the law as requiring what they prefer, both because everyone 
tends to see the world as they want it to be, 63 and because judges are 
drawn from groups that have reason to like the status quo. Because 
Hapless will rarely feel the desire to decide differently from the way he 
thinks the law demands, he will probably be able to rationalize a bit of 
manipulation in those few cases in which he does want to decide differ-
ently. Therefore, the objection concludes, we should expect no differ-
ence between real-world Haplesses and those same judges were they to 
adopt Houdini's attitude toward law. 
Hapless is nonetheless more constrained than Houdini for two rea-
sons. First, the political commitments of sitting judges and laws vary. 
We now have some liberal statutes and precedents, and many con-
servative judges. Many judges experience a difference between our rel-
atively liberal laws and how they would like to decide. 64 Of course, 
nothing here turns on the judges being more conservative than the 
statutes. I assume that parallel constraints function when the judge is 
substantially more liberal than the laws. 
Second, how a judge wants to decide is influenced by her beliefs 
about following rules. Because Houdini believes manipulation is ac-
ceptable, he often looks carefully at how he would like to resolve a 
case, and therefore readily uncovers disparities between the law and 
his own.views. Because Houdini does not regard a result being "dic-
tated" by the law as a reason to prefer it, he will want to manipulate 
whenever he finds such a disparity. 
Hapless, by contrast, does not as often consider as a separate ques-
tion how he might decide the case if the law did not seem clear. He 
does not see this inquiry as a central part of his job. Therefore, he will 
less often discover differences. Furthermore, when the law dictates an 
outcome different from the one he prefers initially, he might change 
that subjective reason alone hold it unconstitutional. A law should not be declared unconstitu-
tional just because one does not like it."). 
63. D. GOLEMAN, VITAL LIES, SIMPLE TRUTHS 61-66 (1985); Wilson, Self-Deception With-
out Repression: Limits on Access to Mental States, in SELF-DECEPTION AND SELF-UNDER· 
srANDING 96 (M. Martin ed. 1985). 
64. Although correlations between judicial characteristics and voting patterns have some-
times proved difficult, one correlation is beyond question: judges appointed by Republican presi-
dents vote more often for conservative outcomes than do those appointed by Democrats on all 
issues that have definable liberal and conservative positions. See, e.g., Note, All the President's 
Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Court of Appeals, 87 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 766, 783 (1987) (reporting that Democratic appointees are about twice as likely as Republi-
can appointees to vote for liberal outcomes in an array of cases including discrimination, § 1983, 
and government-benefit claims). 
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his own opinion because he regards a decision being dictated by law as 
a reason to prefer it. Hapless' preferences are more apt to be shaped 
by what the law is than are Houdini's. 
In addition to being individually less constrained, Houdinis de-
crease laws' constraint within a system in two ways. First, if a system 
has many Houdinis, the level of indeterminacy could rise. Rule fol-
lowing is possible partly because we often agree what the relevant cate-
gory is, and what the facts are. We often agree in part because we try 
to follow rules and expect others to do the same. We might find that 
we agree less often if some significant number of judges stopped trying 
to follow rules, and especially if this fact became known and accepted. 
Imagine that all judges had Houdini's belief that a judge should 
play a game, the goal of which is to implement her view of what is best 
for the world, and the rules of which are to write opinions according 
to a vaguely codified set of acceptable legal moves. Imagine also that 
all judges and legislators know that this is the view held by judges. 
Legislation and judging in such a world might become warlike, 
with legislators trying to use words that cannot easily be manipulated 
according to the somewhat standardized rules of the game. Judges 
would try to win battles with each other and with the legislature by 
using tools of interpretation to secure political victories. 65 Perhaps the 
rules of the game would also change as the war escalated. Were this 
the process of decision, we likely would find much less agreement 
about what a rule required. 66 
Second, the perception of Houdinis manipulating in a system can 
drive other judges to adopt Houdini's cynical attitude toward law. 
Judges follow laws that they dislike in part because they value a sys-
tem in which all judges will do the same. They suspend their own 
6S. This would be like trying to write a chain novel in which the goal was to frustrate the 
story being told by some of the other storytellers. Cf R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 
SS, at 228-32. 
66. The doctrines of indeterminacy and underdeterminacy are partially self-fulfilling; the 
more that we believe them, the more they will be true. Cf Schauer, Formalism, 91 YALE L.J. 
S09, S19-20 (1988). Schauer offers three views of constraint. In the first model, judges can al-
ways avoid an apparently applicable rule by using an available escape route, or can add to the list 
of escape routes. In model two, judges can also always find an escape, but must use existing 
doctrines. In model three, judges will sometimes find themselves unable to use an escape route, 
and will therefore feel compelled to apply a rule even if they do not like the outcome. 
Schauer wonders whether the formalism of model three is psychologically possible. Id. at 
S30. One factor that makes it psychologically possible, and that could make it stable, is the 
widespread belief that it is both possible and morally required for acceptable judging. If judges 
and others whose respect they need believe that the stock of escape routes is closed, and that 
those available have clearly defined acceptable uses, then - although they will in fact sometimes 
invent new ones, and use the existing ones broadly - they will sometimes refrain from doing so 
to maintain their self-respect and the respect of others. Formal rules will then have succeeded in 
constraining decision. 
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moral views to some extent in order to be part of a system in which 
other judges will suspend their moral views to some extent. The per-
ception that the other judges are breaching that agreement removes 
one incentive to continue putting aside their own moral views. The 
perception of manipulation can thus lead to more manipulation. 67 
Although I cannot name names or offer proof, it is my sense that an 
increasing number of judges - liberal and conservative - are falling 
prey to the temptations of Houdini's attitude, and that this is both 
fueled by and fueling what some perceive as an increasingly politicized 
judiciary. 
C. How Introspection Threatens Partially Self-Fulfilling Beliefs 
So far, I have argued that how much law constrains depends in 
part on what judges believe about their decisions. Houdini is less con-
strained than other judges, and the presence of Houdinis can make 
judges less constrained, either by reducing the determinacy of law gen-
erally, or by causing otherwise sincere judges to defect toward Hou-
dini's attitude. To connect this argument with nonintrospection, I 
next consider whether judges with accurate understandings of their 
own behavior might be less constrained than those who hold false be-
liefs. I also suggest that they might be less candid. Introspection 
might lead Hapless and Hercules to abandon their theories, becoming 
Houdinis themselves, or to adopt attitudes that, although not so cyni-
cal as Houdini's, would reduce law's constraint. 
Were Hapless to introspect, he would discover that he cannot al-
ways decide cases without some reliance on his own moral and polit-
ical views, at least at the stage when he describes the issue to be 
67. Consider the analogy between judges' roles and a prisoners' dilemma. See generally M. 
TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF CooPERATION (1987); A. RAPOPORT, Two PERSON GAME THE· 
ORY (1966); A. RAPOPORT & A. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA: A STUDY IN CoNFLicr 
AND CooPERATION (1965). Judges could be understood to benefit by changing law to fit more 
closely with their moral views, and harmed when judges with different values do the same. Each 
judge might individually be made best off if she ignores the law when she disagrees with it, and if 
the other judges always follow the law. But if society benefits from the predictability of rule 
following, or other virtues of constraint, society might benefit if judges almost always follow the 
law. 
Because judges decide cases repeatedly, one can see judging as an iterated prisoners' dilemma. 
As well, it has the opportunity for degrees of defection, and for defecting while trying to hide the 
fact that one is defecting. In such circumstances, it is possible for cooperation to emerge as a 
stable pattern. See, e.g., M. TAYLOR, supra, at 65-78. However, if one player perceives the 
others to be defecting, this perception can lead to further defections. 
I do not mean to suggest that the prisoners' dilemma captures the subtle and complex forces 
affecting judging. Judges have many interests and many reasons for following laws that they do 
not like. As well, unlike most prisoners' dilemma models, judges cannot know when other judges 
defect, because disagreeing and cheating look alike. Nonetheless, one force that helps judges to 
follow rules could be the belief that other judges will do so as well. If so, the perception of 
Houdinis can lead to more Houdinis. 
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decided. Hapless' formalism hides moral choices that he makes when 
he frames issues and selects levels of abstraction for the terms in his 
syllogisms. 
Hercules might likewise be disappointed by introspection. Hercu-
les believes that he should not ignore a huge portion of cases that defy 
a best theory of law, and that he should not select principles that best 
fit his own political and moral preferences. 68 CLS arguments strongly 
support the conclusion that Hercules' task is not always possible. 
Legal doctrine is sometimes so internally contradictory that no theory 
is consistent with a large portion of decided cases. 69 
Even if Dworkin is correct in thinking that Hercules' task is possi-
ble for a judge with superhuman intelligence, no real judge could ever 
construct such a theory.70 An introspective judge would discover that 
she often violated Dworkin's requirement that her "threshold of fit" 
not be "derivative from and adjustable to [her] convictions of 
justice. "71 
Hercules or Hapless might renew some form of denial in order to 
maintain some self-esteem. By doing so, each could retain the belief 
that he was succeeding at the requirements of his role. Alternatively, 
each might alter his belief about what constituted a legitimate decision 
so that his beliefs conformed to an action at which he could actually 
succeed.72 
Of course, introspection might not drive Hapless or Hercules 
either to denial or to abandon their theories. Often, following law is 
possible. Introspection would reveal to both judges_ that they some-
times succeed at their tasks. Nonetheless, I contend that if Hapless 
and Hercules introspect and discover the extent to which they follow 
the law, the risk increases that they will defect to Houdini's position 
and therefore be less constrained and less candid. 
To focus the argument, consider a group of district judges facing 
statutory interpretation issues. They believe in formalism as a means 
of decision when there are rules to apply, and some version of 
Dworkinian best fit theory when they find gaps, conflicts, or ambigui-
ties in the rules. In this group, a judge follows a rule when she finds 
facts, locates a statutory provision that applies to the;m, and does both 
things in a way that most everyone who considered the matter with a 
68. See A. Altman, supra note 57, at 231. 
69. See id. at 222-24. ' 
70. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 264-65. 
71. Id. at 255. 
72. This is the central insight of cognitive dissonance theory. See supra notes 33-38 and 
accompanying text. 
320 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:296 
view toward finding and following a rule would agree. Similarly, she 
fills gaps when she acts in a way that most others would agree is the 
most consistent with principles implicit in the law. Such consensus is 
often available, even among judges with different political and moral 
views. 
Assume that there is consensus about the existence of a rule or a 
determinative principle in 70% of the cases before the judges. Assume 
further that the judges believe there is such a consensus in 90% of the 
cases before them. Everyone agrees that 10% of the cases are indeter-
minate either by rules or by principles, and that disagreement about 
what to do should be expected among judges with different moral or 
political beliefs in these cases. 73 I am assuming for the example that 
judges overestimate their ability to follow law. This example will sug-
gest why introspection increases the risks of Houdinis assuming such 
overestimation. I take up the validity of this assumption below. 
In 20% of the cases, judges mistakenly think they are following 
rules or being guided by principles. In these cases, they have erred in 
thinking that there would be a consensus about the presence of a rule 
or the dominance of a principle. In fact, other judges with different 
moral and political views would decide these cases differently. Per-
haps they have been blinded to ambiguities in the statute or in the 
precedents by their own moral positions. This possibility should not 
be surprising. We all tend to see as universal things about which we 
feel strongly.74 
These judges are not introspective. They mistakenly fail to notice 
in every fifth case that they do not follow rules or find the best fit. 
They might, however, introspect in two ways: (1) identify the cases in 
which they wrongly think that they have followed a rule or found the 
best fit; or (2) realize that these cases exist, so that they have an accu-
rate understanding of the fact and frequency of their mistakes. I sug-
gest that although dispelling inaccurate self-conceptions in either way 
could have salutary effects, it might decrease both constraint and 
candor. 
Consider an example. Two judges separately hear a criminal case 
against Bob. Judge A supports abortion rights. Judge B strongly fa-
vors protecting the accused. Bob gave a party attended by his niece, 
whom he knew to be 14 and pregnant. When she arrived at the party, 
he motioned toward the bar and said, "Help yourself to a Martini." 
73. I offer these numbers simply to illustrate a point. I would be just as happy to make the 
same point with numbers indicating somewhat more indeterminacy. 
74. See, e.g., Ross, Green & House, The "False Consensus Effect": An Egocentric Bias in 
Social Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 279 (1977). 
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Bob is charged with two counts of "knowingly serving alcohol to a 
minor." The statute defines minor as "anyone under the age of eight-
een." Count one is for serving his niece; count two is for serving her 
unborn fetus. 15 
Judge A convicts on the first count and acquits on the second, find-
ing both to be easy cases. A believes the first case fa11s squarely under 
the literal meaning of the statute and its obvious purpose, and that the 
second is clearly outside both. She suppos~ that reasonable people do 
not understand fetuses to be "under the age of eighteen" or to be 
"served" when someone offers a drink to a pregnant woman. 
Judge B finds both cases uncertain. She is not sure whether Bob 
"served" alcohol, since he did not pour the drink or bring her the 
glass. She is not sure whether someone not yet born is "under the age 
of eighteen." 
It seems to me that there is clear law in case one, that Judge A 
followed it, and that Judge B was wrong to see it as uncertain. Case 
two is less clear, Judge B correctly saw it as uncertain, and Judge A's 
certainty seems misplaced. 
A and B might have made their mistakes due to the pull of their 
underlying political beliefs. Perhaps A did not see the ambiguity in 
case two because she feels so strongly that a fetus is not a person, and 
that fetal abuse and abortion rights are connected issues. Perhaps B 
saw case one as uncertain because she really opposes paternalistic 
legislation. 
If such unconscious factors did influence A and B, perhaps A and B 
could become aware that they were influenced by controversial moral 
views. By recognizing a consensus against her own intuitions, B might 
follow the consensus, and convict Bob on count one, thereby increas-
ing constraint. In case two, A might expose the indeterminacy and 
offer moral reasons for acquitting on count two. Recognizing the in-
determinacy might improve her decision, because she would give more 
thought to the best thing to do. 
Of course, one might think A less constrained in the sense that she 
would no longer feel compelled to follow what she formerly perceived 
to be a rule. However, A is not rea11y less constrained. First, recogniz-
ing the absence of a rule would not alter A's decision in this case be-
cause A liked the outcome she thought the rule dictated. Therefore, 
she was not constrained at a11. Second, even if she had disliked the 
rule, the thing that she thought constrained her was not a rule, but her 
75. This case is not entirely fanciful. A Florida woman was recently convicted for delivery of 
cocaine after she "delivered" cocaine to her fetus through the umbilical cord. See Cocaine 
Mother Gets 15 Years Probation, L.A. Times, Aug. 26, 1989, § 1, at 2, col. 1. 
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misperception. I will call this false constraint - deferring to what one 
mistakenly believes to be a legal rule. I do not count removing false 
constraint as decreasing the real constraint of law. 
I expect that genuine false constraint, in which a judge wrongly 
believes a case governed by a rule she dislikes, is rare. 76 A judge 
would not misperceive the law to forbid her desired outcome. Moti-
vated misperceptions would usually lead judges to misperceive the law 
as supporting their desired results as it did for A. 
In sum, introspection might have only good effects. It might (1) 
increase the constraint of law; (2) encourage awareness of real uncer-
tainty; (3) possibly decrease law's false constraint; and (4) increase the 
accuracy of judges' stated reasons for decision. 
On the other hand, the judges might react less desirably. B might 
not care to convict on count one. If she did not see the consensus 
because she felt strongly about the issue, she might ignore the rule 
once it came to her attention. A might find that her real motives are 
not disclosable in contemporary legal dialogue. If she felt strongly 
about the matter, she might prefer to abandon candor, and offer le-
gally acceptable but insincere reasons for her decision. 
If A recognizes case two as indeterminate, but writes an opinion 
pretending that she is following a rule, introspection would not have 
improved her decision. It would have moved her toward Houdini's 
attitude by making her used to abandoning candor self-consciously. 
At least when misled, she was candid. Similarly, if B ignores the rule 
and acquits on count one, introspection would have made her more 
like Houdini because she too would be used to abandoning candor, 
and because she would be used to ignoring what she believes to be the 
law. 
The need to reduce dissonance might lead introspective judges to 
adopt Houdini's attitude. A and B believe that they must follow rules 
when they exist, and find the best fit with principles in the law when 
rules do not, and that they must offer publicly acceptable reasons for 
decision when neither is possible. Introspection would lead them to 
see that they sometimes had strong desires to violate laws, and some-
times wanted to decide for nondisclosable reasons. Their commitment 
to the rule of law would make these desires uncomfortable. 
They might resolve this dissonance in two ways. They might over-
come their desire. They might alter their vision of acceptable behavior 
76. False constraint does not correspond to the 20% error rate I hypothesize. Rather this 
error rate includes cases in which judges believe there is a rule, incorrectly, but prefer the out-
come they wrongly view as dictated anyway. False constraint requires wrongly believing in the 
existence of a rule one does not want. 
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so that indulging their desires by manipulating or offering duplicitous 
opinions seems legitimate. Which solution a judge will pick seems un-
certain. It will depend on the strength of the judge's desire and the 
relative difficulty of adopting Houdini's attitude. My point so far is 
simply that introspection creates a risk that strong desires for particu-
lar outcomes together with some weakness of will might lead intro-
spective judges to become Houdinis. 
Given this account, one might wonder why I think Houdini less 
constrained by law than nonintrospective judges. According to the 
example, Houdini reaches the same result as the two misled judges. 
Unlike this example, Houdini will ignore law more often than mis-
led judges. B might ignore some rules when she is strongly motivated 
to so do. If, however, noticing that she is ignoring rules makes her 
very uncomfortable, she will likely do so only when she can avoid no-
ticing it, or when the rule itself makes her very uncomfortable. Be-
cause Houdini may try to ignore rules self-consciously when he 
dislikes the rule only a little, he will be less constrained by law. 
Consider next what might happen if (more-realistically) introspec-
tion cannot reveal which 20% of cases judges mistakenly take to be 
governed by rules or principles. A judge might be blind to other posi-
tions in these cases because of the strength of her moral and political 
views. Still, she might acknowledge that she will mistakenly charac-
terize one in five of her decisions as decisions dictated by law. 
This discovery too could lead the judge to adopt Houdini's atti-
tude. Most people, confronted with failure, go on trying to succeed, 
because they believe in the goal. At some level of inevitable failure, 
however, people stop trying. Instead, they redefine success to protect 
their self-esteem. Often they find virtue in the acts that they used to 
define as failure. 
Whether introspective judges would abandon following law as a 
primary goal is unclear. Perhaps judges succeed enough that their 
failures present no obstacle to continued efforts. Perhaps not. This is 
a risk of introspection. If judges cannot identify when they ignore law, 
then the risk might be unwise. Although introspection creates a risk 
of more Houdinis, it offers little increase in the likelihood of rule fol-
lowing, since judges will be unable to identify which cases are exam-
ples of failure. 
The force driving these two arguments is a concern over judges 
defecting from sincere effort to cynical manipulation. Evaluating this 
risk is admittedly intuitive. Perhaps Houdinis are more the product of 
Machiavellian temperaments developed before taking the bench than 
of disillusionment or of conflict between desire and obligation. Cyni-
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cism toward law 'might be harder to produce than I have suggested. 
Perhaps it would be less likely if all judges could be induced to intro-
spect all at the same time, in an atmosphere where they could share 
their discoveries. But if we urge introspection, we do so taking a risk 
on these questions. 
Even if it caused no defections, introspection could increase law's 
indeterminacy. If judges who believe wrongly in 90% determinacy 
came correctly to understand· that only 70% of cases are governed by 
law, this discovery could itself further reduce law's determinacy. 
Law's determinacy need not be stable. If judges came to believe 
that law is less determinate than they formerly thought, they might 
become increasingly willing to consider and to look for indetermina-
cies in the law. Although this willingness could decrease some false 
constraint, it might reduce law's real constraint as well. The existence 
of legal rules depends on consensus about meaning. Such consensus 
could deteriorate as willingness to look for gaps, conflicts, and ambi-
guities increased. As the consensus decreased, the real constraint of 
law would decrease as well. 
To summarize, I have offered three ways that introspection could 
reduce law's constraint. First, if introspection makes plain to judges in 
which cases they want to rule either for nondisclosable reasons or 
against a legal rule, it could lead them to adopt Houdini's attitude, 
rather than suppress strong desires. If denial formerly permitted them 
to believe that they followed law and yet sometimes to indulge their 
strongest desires not to follow law, introspection might force them to 
choose. Second, recognition of how often they fail could lead to defec-
tion just to reduce the dissonance of knowing that one fails. Both 
these defection options would reduce constraint and candor. Third, 
without defecting, judges who recognize law's open texture could be-
have in ways that make law less constraining. 
My arguments have presumed that judges do not already have en-
tirely accurate understandings of their decisions. If judges know ex-
actly when and how often they follow rules and principles, and when 
they are unable to do so because their decisions depend on controver-
sial political views, then ignorance of these details cannot play a role in 
constraint. I have only shown that if judges are overly optimistic 
about the frequency with which they follow law, revealing their over-
statement could diminish constrained and candid judging. 
I do not presume to know either what judges believe about their 
decisions or how often judges follow law. Yet, I see several reasons to 
suppose that judges might overestimate the level of determinacy 
achieved by looking to law. First, we have all been educated in the 
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virtues of the rule oflaw. It seems likely that many judges have inter-
nalized these virtues as norms. Second, psychological studies indicate 
that many people overestimate their -0wn ability to succeed at tasks 
that they attempt, 77 and that few decisionmakers have the ability to 
assess what factors influence their decisions. 78 Third, judicial opinions 
are written as if very many cases were dictated by clear rules or princi-
ples, even in appellate courts where we have reason to think that cases 
are not so clear as the opinions suggest. 79 If judges consider these 
opinions to be candid revelations of their reasons for decision, judges 
must experience their jobs as more constrained than is true. Fourth, 
taking moral responsibility for deciding indeterminate cases is un-
pleasant, giving judges a reason not to notice how often they make 
rather than follow law. Fifth, a wide array of scholars and judges has 
supposed for a long time that judges lack clear insight into their deci-
sionmaking process. 80 Though none of these reasons is dispositive, 
they suggest that some judges hold somewhat inaccurate views of their 
decisions. 
By considering the possibility that judges are misled, I do not mean 
to adopt the arrogant position that academics have some privileged 
view, or that we are smarter than judges. Surely we do not and are 
not. I suggest only that when a person adopts a role, which will have 
some socially constructed definitions of success, she will have a differ-
ent view of her own actions than will someone who need not function 
in that role. 
The arguments offered so far show why I think the belief in law is 
partially self-fulfilling. Judges who believe law constrains are indeed 
more constrained as a result of their beliefs. But they are not quite as 
constrained as they think. Judges' beliefs about their decisions are 
perhaps inaccurate, though they are closer to being true because 
judges hold them. 
In arguing that judges overestimate their ability to follow the law, 
77. See, e.g., Feather, Trying and Giving Up, in SELF-DEFEATING BEHAVIORS, supra note 21, 
at 67. 
78. See, e.g., c. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND AMERICAN LAW 246-51 (1983); R. HOGARTH, 
JUDGEMENT AND CHOICE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DECISION 56-57 (2d ed. 1987); KoneCni & 
Ebbesen, The Mythology of Legal Decision Making, 7 INTL. J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 5, 6-7 (1984) 
(reviewing empirical research on judicial decisions and concluding that "legal decisions are actu-
ally very simple, in the sense that very few factors are typically taken into account, and that the 
few factors which are taken into account are generally not those which the decisionmakers claim 
they are responsive to"); Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 4, at 233 ("People often cannot report 
accurately on the effects of particular stimuli on higher order inference-based responses .... The 
accuracy of subjective reports is so poor as to suggest that any introspective access that may exist 
is not sufficient .... "). 
79. See, e.g., R. CoVER, supra note 29, at 232-36. 
80. See, e.g., works cited supra note 2; Posner, supra note 1. 
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I have supposed that sometimes law clearly dictates a result, and have 
relied on broad consensus to pick out these cases. Some have sug-
gested that if individual judges can err about the law as a result of 
denial or rationalization, actual legal meaning cannot be defined in 
terms of consensus. After all, if. individual judges are subject to psy-
chological mechanisms that cause them sometimes to misperceive law, 
groups of judges must sometimes suffer the same fate. Therefore con-
sensus cannot form the basis for meaning. 
I disagree. I have defined legal rules as what almost all people who 
view their task as trying to follow law would agree are rules, despite 
their varying moral and political opinions on the issue. If (and these 
are two big ifs) judges are sincere, and if they hold a wide spectrum of 
views, it seems extremely unlikely that they would all arrive at the 
same position through error, especially the sort of motivated error that 
I have been discussing. Judges deny when they have reason to do so, 
in the form of a desire to rule for nondisclosable reasons, or against 
what they think the law is. But if judges hold a wide enough set of 
moral and political views, those who disagree with each other on 
moral issues would not tend to err about the law in the same direction. 
Moral disagreement serves as a check against group illusion. In other 
words, consensus is a relatively safe basis for legal meaning in a suffi-
ciently heterogeneous community. 
So far I have offered half of my justification for nonintrospective 
judging: nonintrospection increases the chance that law constrains 
most. In Part II, I give reasons for thinking that such constraint is 
desirable. But the justification is nontransparent. 
The justification is not so glaringly nontransparent as the third rea-
son for telling Anne's parents to follow me to the tree. In that case, 
telling them the reason was certain to deprive them of an ability and 
absolutely debilitating for the task. Therefore, they could know noth-
ing about the justification. The nontransparency of my justification for 
nonintrospection is more attenuated. First, it is not certain that dis-
covering how they decide cases would decrease rule following or trans-
form judges into Houdinis. Rather, I have suggested that 
introspection increases the risks of these events. Second, even if the 
truth did decrease rule following, it would not destroy the possibility 
of law. Instead, it might make law marginally less constraining. 
Third, whether judges are in fact aware of the things that I claim they 
avoid noticing is not at all clear. Nevertheless, I have offered some 
account of how and why judges might maintain inaccurate beliefs 
about their behavior. 
Admittedly, the plausibility of this theory varies depending on 
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whether one is discussing trial courts, intermediate courts of appeals, 
or supreme courts; whether the decisions involve detailed statutes, 
common law precedents, or broad constitutional provisions; and 
whether the judge is more or less experienced, sophisticated or careful. 
Perhaps for Supreme Court Justices deciding constitutional cases, the 
theory has little descriptive power. I think it fairly useful in thinking 
about lower courts, and especially about statutory decisions. 
II. VIRTUES AND VICES OF ACCURATE BELIEFS 
In this Part, I discuss virtues and vices of introspective judging. I 
consider two prominent positions. The first suggests that introspective 
judges would reach better decisions. The second suggests that intro-
spective judges would advance a left political agenda. I contend that 
introspective judges would probably do neither. 
A. The Traditional Version 
1. Better Decisions 
Usually decisions improve if decisionmakers have more, and more 
accurate, information.81 Decisions might improve if judges accurately 
understood their own decisionmaking process. If judges wrongly be-
lieve that a given case is indeterminate, discovering that a rule really 
applies might lead them to defer to the rule, or more candidly to admit 
and to justify overruling it or creating a new exception. Judges will be 
more constrained when introspective, because when they come to rec-
ognize that they are manipulating the law for formerly unconscious 
reasons, they will not continue to do so. 
If judges wrongly believe that a case is determined by law, discov-
ering how prior cases or statutes are really ambiguous might induce 
them to consider moral reasons for their decisions more carefully. If 
judges wrongly believe that they are not being influenced by one of 
their own controversial moral views, discovering the truth might per-
mit them to offer those views in their opinions. 82 If the view is not 
81. There are exceptions. One literature suggests that when people believe they are reaching 
decisions based on a wide variety of information, often they actually decide based on a very few 
variables. See, e.g., KoneCni & Ebbesen, supra note 78. As well, sometimes too much informa-
tion can be debilitating. Usually too much information is understood to be too difficult to absorb. 
See, e.g., R. WURMAN, INFORMATION ANxlETY (1989); Grether, Schwartz & Wilde, The Irrele-
vance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 277 
(1986). In some areas, even well understood information can lead to worse decisions. See Reed, 
Information in Political Markets: A Little Knowledge Can Be a Dangerous Thing, 5 J.L. EcoN. & 
ORG. 355 (1989). 
82. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 1, at 959 (suggesting that judges would reach better deci-
sions if they attended group psychotherapy). 
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appropriate for public discourse, recognizing this fact could help the 
judge to reconsider the decision. Further, if judges more accurately 
revealed the forces that move them to decide, lawyers and commenta-
tors would be able more directly to address judges' real concerns. 83 
Introspection could promote constraint, dialogue, and wise decisions. 
I have suggested several reasons not to expect these desirable ef-
fects. Whether introspection could improve decisions depends both on 
what sorts of errors judges can recognize, and on how judges would 
react to such insight. First, judges might not be able to identify cases 
in which they are influenced not to follow the law. If so, insight might 
mean coming to know that they fail to follow it sometimes, which 
would not necessarily offer benefits. Second, depending on why judges 
fail to notice that they are not following law in the first place, intro-
spection might have just the opposite effect from the one supposed by 
the traditional argument. If judges fail to notice because they are 
strongly motivated to reach particular decisions, then introspection 
raises the risk that this motivation will dominate their commitment to 
candor and rule of law, leading them to adopt Houdini's attitude. If it 
did create more Houdinis, law would constrain less, candor would de-
crease, and decisions would not improve. Additionally, accurately 
recognizing the level of constraint could decrease determinacy, even 
for judges who dQ not defect. 
Consequently, whether introspection would have good or bad ef-
fects seems very difficult to predict. I claim only that the virtues at-
tributed to it by the traditional argument are not obviously more 
certain to occur than their opposites, and that introspection carries 
with it some risk of harm. Introspection could lead to constraint and 
candor or to dupli~ity and less constraint. 
2. Less Constraining Law 
In evaluating introspection, one must consider not only whether 
introspection will decrease constraint and candor, but also whether we 
should want law to constrain less. Constraint serves important values, 
but it also prevents good decisions. In this section, I argue that even if 
law constrains too much, we should prefer a system without Houdinis. 
In section 11.B, I consider whether we should want or could easily 
create a system of candid and less constrained decision through 
introspection. 
83. See Minow & Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 37, S4-SS (1988) (argu-
ing for introspection as facilitating dialogue). Minow and Spelman also argue that if judges do 
not disclose the real animating motives for decision, they fail morally by not meeting "the critical 
responsibility to give account to the human beings affected." Id. at SS. 
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In general, the virtues and vices of having judges·follow what they 
believe to be the law are well known. If judges follow law, rather than 
doing in each case what seems to them best, many difficulties are mini-
mized. Decisions are more predictable, offering notice to potential liti-
gants, permitting planning, deterring litigation, and promoting 
stability. If the applicable law was established by a legislature or by 
many judges over time, following law limits the power of individual 
judges, promoting the values of decisionmaking by consensus. Finally, 
if judges hold views aberrant from or unacceptable to the community, 
constraining judges limits the implementation of unacceptable values. 
Constraint also has well known drawbacks. Rules are often over-
and under-inclusive given their main justifications. Discarding rules 
often offers more just decisions. 84 As well, constrained decisions are 
inherently conservative, in the sense of preventing change. Law some-
times progresses when judges change it. 
In deciding whether judges should follow law that they think bad, 
we engage in a tradeoff among these values. Often the decision is 
thought to rest on a risk-of-error analysis. We ask whether in given 
circumstances the benefits of stability, predictability, and notice are 
more important than the possibility of well-tailored decisions and im-
proved laws, and whether we worry that judges will make bad rather 
than good changes. I offer no solution to this difficult question. 
Whatever resolution is appropriate, Hapless and Hercules are prefera-
ble to Houdini. 
Nonintrospective judges could better promote rule-of-law virtues. 
They will reach decisions that evidence consensus about particular 
rules and values more often than Houdini. Hapless and Hercules are 
constrained by a social and interactive process. They often convince 
themselves that they are following law when they believe, and antici-
pate that others would agree, that a rule is applicable or that a value is 
present. Because they repeatedly receive praise, criticism, and other 
feedback to these decisions, they can often make good predictions 
about how other people will react to their claim of rule following or 
value discovery. Because they need to maintain their self-esteem, 
which is dependent on internalized norms that are in part socially cre-
ated, they must accurately predict what others will consider accepta-
ble acts. They will be most constrained when they anticipate violating 
some consensus about what counts as following the rules or discover-
ing values, because in these cases they will be more likely to fear retri-
84. F. SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES (forthcoming). 
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bution both from their own egos and from external criticism. 85 
Although Houdini is also constrained not to ignore consensus about 
the law, he will less often need to follow consensus positions if he can 
get away with some manipulation. 
A world populated by Hapless and Hercules would also offer more 
stability, predictability, and notice than a world with more Houdinis. 
Because Hercules and Hapless will be more reluctant to deviate from 
what they believe to be a rule or a clear principle, and because they 
will have this belief when they think most other people will share it, 
their actions will be more predictable, and therefore offer more notice, 
than Houdini's. Although any given Houdini might be very predict-
able if we know something about his political or moral views, trying to 
predict outcomes in a world populated by Houdinis with different 
views would be difficult. Further, judges' beliefs that they should fol-
low law even if they disagree with its wisdom might at the margin lead 
judges to avoid overruling, ignoring, or creating exceptions to rules, 
which would in tum promote some stability. 86 Of course, these argu-
ments are most plausible if one believes that introspection might drive 
sincere judges to defect and become Houdinis. Still, introspection 
would undermine some of these values if it simply reduced the deter-
minacy of law. 
Some might suggest that we have no reason to dislike Houdini. So 
long as judges -0ffer a publicly acceptable reason for their decision us-
ing the language of rules, precedents, and other legal discourse, they 
will be sufficiently constrained for rule-of-law purposes. We should 
not require judges to be convinced by the arguments they offer. Law 
develops in part because judges change it when it seems to them bad. 
Some of the most important decisions can be understood as manipula-
85. See, e.g., Gilbert & Cooper, Social Psychological Strategies of Self-Deception, in SBLP· 
DECEPTION AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING, supra note 63, at 75, 82-84 ("In a complex social net-
work, people govern each other's outcomes, acting as gatekeepers who control rewards and mete 
out punishments. Such mutual interdependence requires people to arrive at a shared conception 
of social reality, including that aspect of social reality known as the self."); D. GOLBMAN, supra 
note 63, at 159-93. 
86. The possibility that judicial nonintrospection is justified by traditional rule-of-law virtues 
was suggested to me by Margaret Radin's recent article, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 62 B.U. 
L. REv. 781 (1989). Radin's project was to salvage some of the rule-of-law virtues while re-
jecting a formalist conception of rules in favor of a Wittgensteinian belief that rules exist when 
and to the extent that there is social agreement that a rule has been followed. I agree with her 
that even if rules function very differently from the way legal philosophers have often assumed, 
we can still invoke some of the virtues traditionally associated with rules to justify the way that 
rules do function. But I do not think that we should offer such justifications to judges. Radin 
styles her proposal as pragmatic. Probably a pragmatist should not want to import Wittgen· 
stein's insights into law. Even if there is nothing more to rule-following than there being a con-
sensus about whether a rule has been followed, believing that rule following is more than this is 
part of what fosters the consensus. 
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tions, in the sense that they altered the law while purporting to follow 
it. 
Although I agree that judges should sometimes change the law, 
and conceivably that they ought on rare occasion to do so without 
disclosing this fact or their reasons for doing so, we should not want 
Houdinis for two reasons. First, if we must choose between misled, 
candid judges and informed, duplicitous judges, we should prefer mis-
led judges on moral grounds. Of course, one need not view Houdini as 
immoral. Writing opinions is an argumentative practice. Not all ar-
gumentative practices require sincere belief. Competitive debate and 
advocacy in court, for example, do not morally require that their par-
ticipants believe the arguments they offer. The points of deJ>ating and 
of advocacy would not be well served by such requirements. In decid-
ing whether manipulation counts as a moral wrong for judges, we need 
to consider whether the point of judging is' served by a sincerity re-
quirement. One can imagine a system in which judging resembled de-
bating or advocacy. The adversary system of adjudication, however, 
seems designed to have deliberative, not argumentative, judging. 
Much of this paper is devoted to showing why we should prefer a 
system in which judging requires more sincere commitment to argu-
ments than debating, advocacy, or being a Houdini. If I succeed in 
making such a prudential showing, then manipulation should be con-
sidered immoral on the ground that it is a form of insincere argument 
that in context makes the practice of legal justification less effective. 
As such, insincere justifications are harmful lies. 
Second, though judges should sometimes ignore law, we might not 
·want them to do so in the cases that Houdini would choose. Houdini 
will ignore law whenever he desires, limited only by political con-
straints, reversal, and the limits of his ability to manipulate existing 
precedents and statutes. Hercules and Hapless will ignore law only 
when all these factors are present, and they disagree with the law so 
much that (a) they do not notice that they are ignoring law; or (b) they 
are more troubled by the badness of the law than by breaking their 
commitment to follow law. Judges who believe they should follow law 
might ignore law only when they view it as very bad. 
Fred Schauer has recently described our legal system as one of pre-
sumptive positivism, 87 by which he means that a judge follows rules 
unless the outcome strikes the judge as very bad, in which case the 
judge engages in a more detailed analysis of the best thing to do. 88 He 
87. F. SCHAUER, supra note 84. 
88. Id. 
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contrasts presumptive positivism with rule-sensitive particularism, by 
which he means always doing what seems best in the case, taking ac-
count of the values of stability, predictability, and notice that are 
served by following rules even if they are otherwise imperfect. 89 
A judge who sees herself as a rule-sensitive particularist will proba-
bly follow rules less often than a judge attempting to follow presump-
tive positivism. The presumptive positivist judge will not ask herself 
about each case whether it is best to follow a rule, but only will ask 
this when she is struck that something is seriously wrong. She will 
therefore follow rules in some cases where, had she considered the 
matter carefully, she would have found the rule less than ideal. 
A judge who tries to engage in rule-sensitive particularism might 
systematically undervalue the importance of rules or social values that 
she does not think significant. We all have some tendency to overesti-
mate short term concerns and to think that our own views are widely 
shared.90 Even rule-sensitive particularists who are aware of these ten-
dencies might not have the strength of will necessary to notice that 
they are overvaluing immediate results and their own values. We 
might therefore get better decisions by creating a system in which 
judges believe they should almost always defer to law, even if we in 
fact want them to ignore law somewhat more often than we say.91 A 
system in which judges ignore and change the law the right amount 
might require the sort of acoustic separation we use for juries. We tell 
them always to follow the law, believing that they will nullify the law 
only when it leads to truly bad results.92 
89. Id. 
90. See, e.g., C. FrrzMAURICE & K. PEASE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL SENTENCING 
19-21 (1986); Ross, Green & House, supra note 74. 
91. This might lead more closely to an accurate rule-sensitive particularism than if judges 
tried to be rule-sensitive particularists. In fact, we might desire even more acoustic separation. 
We might get the right amount of rule following if judges believe that they should follow all rules 
that do not lead to clearly evil results. Presumptive positivism might itself be nontransparent. 
Cf. G. CALABRESI, A CoMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 174 (1982) ("Whom would 
you trust more to decide •.• torture cases generally, as we want them decided, •.. a judge who in 
hard and easy cases is always declaring that we must balance the costs and benefits of torture, or 
the judge who announces that our system has an absolute prohibition against torture?"). 
92. See M. KADISH & s. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 62-65 (1973). I neither defend 
nor condemn jury nullification. I merely draw the analogy between my position on judging and 
the Kadishes' position on juries: by not informing jurors of their right to nullify, we can limit 
nullification to cases in which jurors have a "damn good reason" to ignore law. See United 
States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Simpson, 460 
F.2d 515, 518-20 (9th Cir. 1972). But see Dougherty, 413 F.2d at 1143 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the jury should be informed of its right of nullification); K. GREENAWALT, CON-
FLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 366-67 (1987) (approving jury instructions of the right to nul-
lify); Schellin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, LAW & 
CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 51, 111 (concluding that the jury must be instructed about 
its power to nullify). 
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If so, Houdini is insufficiently constrained. Houdini has no reason 
to ignore only very bad laws. He will ignore the laws that he thinks 
bad whenever he can. 
B. The CLS Version 
1. Critique as Political Tool 
Some CLS scholars offer a very different image of the virtues of 
introspection. 93 The CLS version differs in two main ways from its 
traditional counterpart. First, in comparison to liberal thinkers, CLS 
writers think introspective judges will find that law determines far 
fewer cases. In the extreme, they accept radical indeterminacy. 
Second, CLS writers see critique, or trashing, as a means of social 
change. Elites can pretend the system is just only if they believe inac-
curacies about the rule oflaw.94 Guyora Binder explains: "Legal ide-
ology . . . legitimates inequality for its beneficiaries. It helps its 
beneficiaries believe their society meets the needs of the powerless .... 
This provides - for those powerful people who need it - a justifica-
tion for vigorously repressing confrontational behavior on the part of 
people without power."95 
For example, some critics consider neutral decision theories, such 
as rights theories, harmful to social movements. The world would im-
prove, they say, even for those who appear to depend most on rights, if 
we reached social decisions using some other language, such as dis-
cussing needs or political ideals.96 Using the language of rights harms 
social movements because initial rights victories frequently lead to 
93. I say "some" both because some CLS writers do not advocate critique, and because some 
do not envision critique working to create an enlightened judiciary. Instead, they hope for a 
future with a less important judiciary. See, e.g., R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 
MOVEMENT 31-32 (1986) (offering a proposed government reorganization into more numerous 
branches). 
94. Some have suggested that trashing can be justified on the grounds that it is fun, liberating 
and true. See, e.g., Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229, 
1230 (1981). An even less appealing version of this justification admits that trashing may do 
nothing to alter the behavior of oppressing elites. Trashing will simply make their existence as 
oppressors less comfortable. Mark Kelman has written, for example: 
[I] have a satisfying feeling of fighting a reasonably nonviolent war here. If nothing else, it 
seems only fair that in a world of meritocratic myth in which true victims must often bear 
not only their poverty and inability to control an alien environment but frequently their own 
self doubts as well, spreading at least the self-doubt to the otherwise privileged is the most 
minimal act of revenge. 
Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 327 n.85 (1984) (emphasis added). 
95. Binder, supra note 1, at 29; see also id. at 35-36; Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrench-
ment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 
1358 (1988) ("[I]deology convinces one group that the coercive domination of another is 
legitimate."). 
96. See, e.g., Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REv. 1363', 1384-94 (1984). 
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long-term losses:97 Ifiltially rights critics argued that talking about 
rights offered no benefits - only harms.98 After a significant dialogue 
on the subject,99 however, most critics seemed to agree that the rele-
vant question is whether the real benefits of rights talk are worth the 
real harms. too 
Kim Crenshaw describes this dilemma in advocating civil rights 
for racial minorities. The civil rights movement succeeded so far as it 
did by creating an ideological crisis that challenged the logic of the 
institutional system. tot By pointing to the disparity between the 
American myth of equal opportunity and the obvious fact of racial 
oppression, blacks forced Americans to commit to equality in order to 
maintain their well-loved myth. But that commitment was entirely 
ambiguous between color blindness and substantive equality. The di-
lemma arises because the language of "right to equality" was essential 
97. Rights critics allege that rights harm us in many ways. See generally Symposium: A 
Critique of Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REv. 1363 (1984). I select this particular harm because it seems 
to be the most serious and least controversial. 
98. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 96, at 1384. Even at early stages in this debate, however, 
critics recognized that this is an empirical and contingent claim. See, e.g., id. at 1381. 
99. See Crenshaw, supra note 95; Milner, The Denigration of Rights and the Persistence of 
Rights Talk: A Cultural Portrait, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 631 (1989); Minority Critiques of the 
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1987); Minow, Interpreting 
Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860 (1987); Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist 
Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 387 (1984); Responses to the Minority Critiques of 
the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 295 (1988); Schneider, The 
Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
589 (1986); Symposium: A Critique of Rights, supra note 97; Tushnet, Rights: An Essay In Infor-
mal Political Theory, 17 Pol. & Socy. 403 (1989); West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1 (1988). 
100. Robin West exhibits this ambivalence about rights. West explains that rights talk can-
not capture the harms and values of women because all theories of rights assume the "separation 
thesis" - that we are individuated primarily and only later connected. West, supra note 99, at 
61. Because the separation thesis is false for women, rights only succeed in protecting against 
male fears of annihilation and frustration. She relies partly on Carol Gilligan for the proposition 
that women experience the world as connected. Id. at 14. Many of the substantive rules that 
women most need worry about now - rules about child custody, rape, sexual harassment, and 
abortion - require some understanding of the harm of separation and invasion. Although these 
can be restated in terms of harms to autonomy, the restatement is both untrue to the way women 
experience these harms, and in any case will probably not lead to the right result. Fran Olsen 
also makes this point: "Abstract rights and neutral rules are devices used by feminists to deny 
what we really want while getting what we want indirectly." Olsen, supra note 99, at 429 n.99. 
Yet, for strategic reasons, "reforms have often been won by characterizing women's injuries as 
analogous to, if not identical with, injuries men suffer (sexual harassment as a form of 'discrimi-
nation'; rape as a crime of 'violence')." West, supra note 99, at 61. 
101. Articulating ••• demands through legal rights ideology, civil rights protestors 
exposed a series of contradictions ••.• Rather than using the contradictions to suggest that 
American citizenship was itself illegitimate or false, civil rights protestors proceeded as if 
American citizenship were real, and demanded to exercise the "rights" that citizenship en-
tailed. By seeking to restructure reality to reflect American mythology, Blacks ••• ulti-
mately benefitted •.•• 
Crenshaw, supra note 95, at 1368 (citing F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVE-
MENTS (1977)). 
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to taldng the first important step. Yet that very language has come 
back to haunt the civil rights movement.102 The progress largely 
stopped as soon as the inconsistency became rationalizable by notions 
of formal equality: "Although it is the need to maintain legitimacy 
that presents powerless groups with the opportunity to wrest conces-
sions from the dominant order, it is the very accomplishment of legiti-
macy that forecloses greater possibility. In sum, the potential for 
change is both created and limited by legitimation."103 
Rights victories are sometimes pyrrhic.104 Rights critics would 
solve this dilemma by causing judges to abandon the rhetoric of rules 
and rights. They believe that by establishing an openly political and 
discretionary decisionmaking practice we can move toward a better 
society. These scholars propose that judges and other elites might 
abandon the defenses supported by rights discourse, and then abandon 
the discourse itself, if they could be induced to introspect by critique. 
Actually, the exact goal of introspection varies depending on how 
much indeterminacy the writer thinks exists in law. At the extreme, 
writers who endorse radical indeterminacy hope introspection will 
lead judges to recognize that all decisions are dictated by moral con-
cerns and therefore require moral justification. Those who believe in 
somewhat less indeterminacy want judges to recognize moral and 
political aspects in those cases that law does not control. In the fol-
lowing discussion, I focus on the extreme claim that all decisions are 
and should be recognized as discretionary and therefore subject to 
moral argument. I believe that the analysis applies to the less dra-
matic claims as well. 
The CLS solution does not seem to me prudent, even from the 
perspective of its CLS adherents. I suggest three reasons for hesitating 
over the virtues of induced introspection: critique will likely fail in its 
ambitions; if it fails, it increases the risk of Houdinis, which would 
decrease both candor and constraint; and even for CLS advocates who 
might reject the rule-of-law virtues of constraint, critique is a tactical 
mistake given their political goals. · 
102. Id. at 1366 ("The fundamental problem is that, although Critics criticize law because it 
functions to legitimate existing institutional arrangements, it is precisely this legitimating func-
tion that has made law receptive to certain demands in this area."). 
103. Id. at 1368; see also Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 279·80 (1983) 
(explaining that "[e]galitarian rhetoric has appeal because it is the American political culture's 
natural language . . . . The rhetoric forces judges and other governmental decision makers to 
focus on issues that are real ...• "). 
104. The argument that rights victories are pyrrhic assumes that further rights would in fact 
benefit the people who seek them, rather than backfiring as some conservative scholars allege. 
See, e.g., T. SOWELL, ClvlL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY 133-34 (1984). 
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2. c;itique's Optimism: The Emperor's Clothes 
Critique - or trashing - might not succeed in inducing introspec-
tion. Critique is supposed to induce introspection by revealing contra-
dictions to the legal elites who believe them. The CLS belief seems to 
be that if the incoherence of liberalism is demonstrated clearly, and in 
sufficient detail, 105 eventually legal elites will see and admit the error 
of their ways. If someone tells the emperor that he wears no clothes, 
the emperor and everyone else will finally see and admit the truth.106 
This emperor's-clothes assumption underestimates profoundly 
people's need and ability to generate new defenses, especially when 
they have some strong interest in doing so.107 Belief in neutral deci-
sionmaking helps judges cope with unattractive facts about law. 
Judges harm peopte.1os They make unpopular and difficult decisions. 
Sometimes no wise decision is possible. Almost everyone wants to 
avoid looking at painful facts such as contradictions in their moral 
commitments, deep moral disagreement among members of their own 
community, and the tremendous unfairness of the world.109 
Neutrality theories, such as the determinacy of rules and rights, 
permit judges to deny their own responsibility for these facts. 110 
Judges can believe in the comforting stories of democracy as majority 
rule, and judicial discretion as limited by rights and rules dictated by a 
fair system of constitutionally constrained democracy. If critics prove 
to legal elites that the defenses they use to cope with these unpleasant 
facts are just defenses, elites will not just admit the facts these defenses 
permitted them to avoid.111 Legal elites will not suddenly give up all 
105. See Freeman, supra note 94, at 1235-37. 
106. Some CLS writing refers to the task of critics in terms of the emperor's clothes story. 
See, e.g., D' Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain Any Legal Decision?, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
513, 536-38 (1989); cf. Miller, A Note on the Criticism of Supreme Court Decisions, 10 J. Pus. L. 
139, 148 (1961). 
107. See, e.g., A. FREUD, supra note 24, at 49 (indicating that when one defense mechanism 
fails, people move on to another). 
108. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986); Schaughnessy, Gilligan's 
Travels, 7 LA w & INEQUALITY 1, 23-24 (1988). 
109. A substantial, if somewhat controversial, literature suggests that people use a series of 
defenses to maintain a belief that the world is basically just, and that most people get what they 
deserve. In order to maintain this belief in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, 
people (1) deny or withdraw from the suffering, or (2) reinterpret the event so that they can 
understand it as deserved. For a summary of empirical studies on both sides of this issue, see M. 
LERNER, supra note 30. 
110. See R. CoVER, supra note 29, at 229-38 (arguing that in order to reduce dissonance, 
antislavery judges ruling against fugitive slaves overstated the need for rule of law, the extent to 
which they were bound by prior cases, and the extent to which their decisions were dictated by 
others). 
111. Others have noted that critique as practiced by CLS writers has little chance to succeed, 
because they must choose between demonstrating stark contradictions in oversimplified positions 
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of the complicated forms of rationalization and denial that permitted 
them to live with the pain of their profession from the start.112 
If neutrality theories really are defenses, judges will seek less pain-
ful alternatives such as (a) dismissing the critique; (b) if the critique 
cannot be ignored, finding some new defense; or (c) modifying their 
behavior so that the critique is not quite so cogent, and then return to 
the defense.113 Only if none of these techniques works will critique 
induce people to abandon denial and rationalization and admit what 
they wanted desperately not to see.114 
Others have noted that the recent history of jurisprudence has been 
an alternating series of critiques and new neutrality myths.115 For 
CLS writers who think liberalism incoherent, this cycle offers histori-
cal evidence that people confronted with the incoherence of liberalism 
will spend a huge amount of time and energy shoring up their views 
with complex theories rather than give up the views. Defeating all 
tactics for avoiding critique is very difficult. 
Our discourse is not just accidentally filled with devices that per-
mit us to avoid looking at what modem academics view as a compli-
cated and contradictory world. Most often, trying to get people to 
abandon their devices for denial by showing them the very things that 
they are trying to deny will fail. Although some academics enjoy sort-
ing through this muck (trashing is fun), we should not forget that the 
muck exists because most people do not. 116 
and finding weaker tensions in more accurate portrayals of people's views. See Brosnan, supra 
note 8, at 332·60. 
112. Boyle argues that to suppose that CLS has such a plan is to mistake CLS for grandiose 
19th century social thought: 
It is ridiculous to believe that one could disrupt the massively entrenched set of power rela-
tions and collective fantasies that "constitutes" repression in our society simply by attacking 
one of the more formalized and abstract fantasies and claiming that the rest are "dependent" 
on it. The lines oflogical entailment are not the threads that hold together the patchwork of 
social reality. To believe otherwise is to make a tactical as well as a theoretical error. 
Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. 
R.Ev. 685, 770 (1985). Boyle nonetheless thinks that more localized critique can be effective. 
113. This third option seems to be Piven and Cloward's interpretation of the success and 
then failure of the civil rights movement See F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 101. 
114. See generally Slusher & Anderson, Belief Perseverance and Self-Defeating Behavior, in 
SELF-DEFEATING BEHAVIORS, supra note 21, at 11. 
115. See, e.g., Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's. 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561 (1988). 
116. Responses to Unger's praise for plasticity have in some ways been similar. Unger seems 
to think that context transcendence is itself a human good. Many critics have pointed out that if 
this is a human good, it is certainly one that we are constituted to avoid - or at least most of us, 
save for a few scholars, and then only sometimes. See, e.g., Van Zant, Commonsense Reasoning, 
Social Change, and the Low, 81 Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 894, 912 (1987) ("Unger's microsociological 
model is descriptively inadequate in that for the most part it ignores the role of everyday routines 
in social life."). 
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3. Failed Critique as Houdini's Parent 
I argued in Part I that introspection increases the risk of creating 
Houdinis. Although CLS writers do not necessarily value rule of law 
virtues, they do not aim to create a duplicitous legal system. If cri-
tique leads to more Houdinis, it will not have succeeded. 
Consider three stages of judicial practice. In the first stage most 
judges are like Hapless or Hercules. They are somewhat mistaken, but 
they are candid and relatively constrained. In stage two, Houdinis 
come to predominate. They are less constrained, and they no longer 
believe the rhetoric they must use in their opinions. Stage two judges 
are introspective, less constrained, and duplicitous. In stage three, 
judges know that all the other judges, and others who might comment 
on their work, share their·contempt for law. So they abandon discus-
sion in the language of rights, rules, and precedent. They reason 
openly about the moral and political goals that their decisions pro-
mote. Judges no longer need to be duplicitous. Neither must they 
follow rules. Stage three judges are introspective, unconstrained by 
law, and once again candid.111 
Critique is more than description.118 It is a political act directed at 
transforming the legal system to stage three, in which judges can be 
both candid and introspective.119 Yet, critics might (despite their 
goals) create and entrench stage two, in which all judges are Houdinis. 
If critical argument convinces many judges that they legitimately de-
cide based on their own political views (stage two), but does not con-
vince and enable judges to alter legal discourse so that public 
acknowledgement of the political nature of judging replaces attempts 
to reason from precedent and other neutral sources (stage three), then 
the project of critique will have failed doubly: judging will become 
introspective, but deceitful, rather than relatively nonintrospective and 
candid. Law will constrain less. The step will have been a step back 
117. Recall that I am discussing versions of CLS critique that are committed to radical inde-
terminacy. Those who adopt a less extreme view would hope for a stage three in which judges 
discuss rules and rights less often than they do at present, and offer moral reasons for their 
decisions more often. 
118. On this interpretation, the critique of rights was misunderstood by some of those who 
responded to it. They thought that the critics meant to commend abandoning rights in favor of 
something else such as needs talk or delegated discretion. The critics did not mean to commend 
anything. They were simply trashing. If so, the correct way to evaluate their project has nothing 
to do with whether they are speaking the truth. Rather the point is to ask whether speaking 
these words was likely to have some good effect. See Tushnet, supra note 96, at 1402 ("What is 
the meaning of writing this article?"). 
119. See Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want To Be Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REv. 247, 267 
(1984). 
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both for those who value constraint and for those who value honest 
dialogue. 
In the end, critique might have no effect, might lead to stage two, 
or might lead to stage three. I suggested above that it might have no 
effect. In order to induce Hapless to become Houdini, critique must 
force Hapless to take responsibility for difficult moral decisions, and to 
recognize himself as a moral agent. 
Despite this difficulty, critique might lead judges privately to aban-
don believing in law. If critique can cause judges to experience suffi-
cient dissonance, judges might alter their ideals of rule following and 
candor. Although some version of neutrality has long been a part of 
the story that judges and lawyers tell themselves to justify their work, 
it is not the only story available. Houdini's attitude has attractions of 
its own. Houdini might believe that manipulation is inevitable, and 
that, so long as it is used to morally good ends, it is justified. Perhaps 
this narrative even permits judges to feel more zealous about their 
jobs. Judges might also believe that other judges are manipulating, so 
they are just acting as a counter, to restore something like the real 
values held by society. Convincing judges like Hapless and Hercules 
to view themselves as moral agents when they formerly viewed them-
selves as functionaries is difficult, especially when they must view 
themselves as moral agents doing violence.120 The possibility of alter-
nate comfortable self-conceptions as a moral agent legitimately acting 
makes this task simpler. Critique could drive judges to stage two. 
I expect that critique cannot easily get judges to alter their dis-
course of opinion writing to reflect this attitude (stage three). First, 
the social consequences of being the first to announce that one does 
not believe in the accepted rules could be significant. Second, even if 
many elites believe the same thing, so that judges do not fear retribu-
tion from their peers, it seems unlikely that the intellectual trends that 
are now permitting judges to see, and perhaps admit, that they some-
times act politically, will soon become widely accepted by the public. 
There is concern for censure by a broader population. 
Of course, the conclusion that critique might not drive judges to 
use openly political discourse is speculative. My concerns about cri-
tique are alternative. If it has no effect, it will do no good. If it fails 
and induces stage two, it will reduce both candor and constraint. If it 
succeeds and induces stage three, I will argue in the next section, it 
will hinder the political objectives of CLS. 
120. See Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation: Of the Word, the Deed, and the 
Role, 20 GA. L. REV. 815 (1986). 
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4. Successful Critique as Tactical Error 
The CLS strategy assumes that if judges discussed only values in 
justifying most or all decisions, the difficulties social movements face 
would decrease, and we would be more likely to create the sort of 
society favored by CLS writers. This strategy seems to me a tactical 
mistake for three reasons: (a) the people empowered by decreased 
constraint largely oppose CLS's political views; (b) abandoning law's 
constraint risks harming oppressed people; and ( c) stage three judges 
will not likely abandon the commitments that limit social change. 
a. Political opposition. If critique does foster stage three, the vic-
tory would not lead to results that appeal to its CLS practitioners. 
Conservatives control the federal courts, many of the state courts, and 
some legislatures.121 The nonconservative judges are moderates and 
moderate liberals. Virtually none shares the political and moral com-
mitments of CLS scholars. Critical legal scholars' self-professed goal 
for trashing is to make judges see how much power they have, so that 
they can no longer deny it. CLS scholars should be concerned that if 
it works, judges might do exactly that. 122 
Consider as an example Richard Posner. 123 Judge Posner believes 
in deciding cases based on practical reason, which includes "anecdote, 
introspection, imagination, common sense, intuition ... , empathy, im-
. ,. d . ' [ d] ' . ' "124 putation ... , custom, memory, m uct1on, ... an expenence. 
Many decisions, says Posner, "depend on the policy judgments, polit-
ical preferences, and ethical values of the judges . . . rather than on 
legal reasoning regarded as something different from policy, or poli-
tics, or values, or public opinion."125 Precedents for Posner are noth-
ing more than something to be consulted. They do not compel: "The 
prior case . . . is just a source of data, anecdotal in character, or of 
reasons, considerations, values, policies."126 
121. See West, Progressive and Conservative Ccnstitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641 (1990) 
(describing the new conservative politics of the federal judiciary). 
122. Some CLS scholars acknowledge that the strategy is risky. See, e.g., Beermann, A Criti· 
cal Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 86-
87 (1989). 
123. I select Judge Posner more for his public rejection of precedent as a system of rules than 
for his conservative politics. Even from a left or liberal perspective, Judge Posner's opinions are 
sometimes relatively progressive. See, e.g., International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 
886 F.2d 871, 902 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J., dissenting) (rejecting the position that fetal protec-
tion policies that apply only to women should be subject to the business necessity defense in Title 
VII suits even though this defense is usually available only in cases of disparate impact), cert. 
granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990). 
124. Posner, supra note 1, at 838 (emphasis added). For further refinements on Posner's 
views, see R. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990). 
125. Id. at 828 (emphasis added). 
126. Id. at 845. 
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Posner joins realist and CLS critics in decrying judicial self-delu-
sion and in advocating that judges be more introspective, and candid 
about not being bound: 
We should hesitate to take at face value descriptions of judges as 
striving always to find the correct answer rather than exercising discre-
tion or enacting their personal values or preferences. . . . Adults delude 
themselves ... ; what is more common than lack of self-knowledge? ... 
. . . Neither the conditions of judging nor the methods of selecting 
judges (including self-selection) would lead one to expect the deep intro-
spection that so much academic literature attributes to judges .... 
. • . [L]ike other people judges want to diffuse responsibility for their 
unpopular, controversial, or simply most consequential actions, and they 
do this by persuading themselves that their decisions are dictated by law, 
rather than the result of choice. 127 
Posner considers that delusion has some virtue. Nonetheless, he seems 
to dismiss the possibility that we should maintain these delusions: 
Maybe the dogmatic style, pretence of humility, and ostentatious abne-
gation of will that characterize judicial opinions serve a social purpose. 
By concealing from the judges themselves the degree to which they exer-
cise discretion, the formalist mode may make them more restrained: vir-
tue begins in hypocrisy (maybe) .... Only one thing is clear: We should 
not be so naive as to infer the nature of the judicial process from the 
rhetoric of judicial opinions.12s 
Judge Posner should be every CLS scholar's hero. He is an intro-
spective judge, ready to admit that judging requires political decisions, 
that judges are not bound by precedent in any interesting case, and 
that they should not strive for objectivity .129 He thinks that judges 
who believe in neutrality are merely deluding themselves. He is pre-
pared to talk about values in his decisions.130 
127. Id. at 872-73. In case it is not apparent, I largely agree with Posner about the extent of 
judicial delusion. I simply disagree with his assumption that this is obviously a vice to be 
abandoned. 
128. Id. at 865. This quote is somewhat ambiguous. Posner might be understood as endors-
ing judicial self-delusion if one interprets his suggestion that "we" should not believe it as refer-
ring just to academics. 
129. In response to the suggestion that judges might engage in "all things considered" deci-
sionmaking, and yet retain some semblance of neutrality by ignoring their own values and prefer-
ences, Posner says that "[a] judge who has a powerful intuition that it would be an outrage to 
decide a particular case a particular way should not feel compelled to decide it that way merely 
because a comparison of the reasons pro and con shows the pros with a slight preponderance." 
Id. at 859. 
130. Although judges' attitudes are difficult to discern, I have not detected the effects of 
Posner's jurisprudence on his decisions. As a judge, he seems still to be engaged in the "ostenta-
tious abnegation of will" that he finds in other judge's pretence of following rules. See, e.g., 
Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731, 741 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) 
("The case against the doctrine seems to us conclusive .... Despite all this we think it would be 
improper for this court to reject the doctrine."). Perhaps the gap between Posner's jurisprudence 
and his opinions supports my suggestion that stage three will be difficult to create. 
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Critical theorists are not enthralled with their intellectual progeny. 
Noting the similarities between Posner and CLS, one commentator 
suggested that practical reasoning advocates such as Posner lack only 
one thing: "an association with an extensive critique of the prevailing 
legal and political order - that is, with the Critical Legal Studies 
movement."131 This comment exemplifies one fallacy of radical cri-
tique: critique wrongly assumes that introspection will lead not only 
to recognition of power, but to political transformation.132 Of course 
Richard Posner lacks an "association with ... the Critical Legal Stud-
ies movement"133 He would not have become a federal judge with 
that association. Conservatives who abandon the belief that they are 
following rules or discovering values will not automatically become 
committed leftists.134 CLS critics should see that removing constraint 
means removing constraint from conservatives.13s 
b. Oppressive instincts. CLS writers believe stage three will benefit 
oppressed people. Several authors have expressed strong reservations 
about this strategy, because constraint sometimes benefits powerless 
people. As Patricia Williams explains, although it is possible that in 
an informal world with fewer or no rights white people would not 
discriminate against blacks any more than they do now, so long as 
rights constrain behavior at all, one has reason to suspect that without 
rights, some people would discriminate who currently do not. 136 Toni 
Massaro agrees, saying that "[a] proposal implying that greater dis-
cretionary authority should be given to legal decisionmakers betrays 
131. Feinman, Practical Legal Studies and Critical Legal Studies, 81 MICH. L. RBv. 724, 730 
(1988). 
132. Cf. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old 
Wounds?. 81 MlcH. L. RBv. 2099, 211S (1989). 
• 133. FCinman, supra note 131, at 730. 
134. The intellectual act of making [judges' normative instincts] more visible and self-
conscious will not by itself change the decisions reached. Although the unveiling of these 
assumptions might spur greater reflection and motivate an occasional change of heart, most 
judges will validate and ratify their informing visions; they decide as they do because of, not 
in spite of, their instincts and assumptions. 
Hutchinson, The Three "Rs": Reading/Rorty/Radically, 103 HARv. L. RBv. SSS, S81-83 
(1989). . 
13S. See Burton, Judge Posner's Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 81 MICH. L. RBv. 710, 722-23 
(1988) (Judge Posner's "skepticism about the existence and identification of law, together with 
advocacy that a judge act on his own social vision" serves "to do away with the traditional 
'fetters that bind judges' in a fell swoop, clearing the decks for a new law based on wealth max-
imization.") (footnote omitted). 
136. See Williams, Alchemical Notes: Restructuring Ideal From Deconstructed Rights, 22 
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. RBv. 401, 423-24 (1987). Not everyone agrees that rights, apart from polit-
ical coalitions, can do anything at all to restrain oppressive instincts. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra 
note 99, at 446 n.72. I disagree for reasons parallel to those offered for thinking law constrains 
judges. In fairness, I note that Tushnet allows that rights have some uses, id. at 440 n.16, and 
that their usefulness is historically contingent. Id. at 42S. 
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tremendous faith in the wisdom and responsiveness of our deci-
sionmakers. One reason to be skeptical about this faith is that 'em-
pathic capacity' ... [islunevenly distributed among human beings."P7 
Of course, constraint can also work against the interest of op-
pressed people. If the rules followed are discriminatory, and those 
who apply the rules are less so, a system with more discretion will be 
better than a system of rigid rule-following.138 The question is contex-
tual. In the United States today, however, the rules publicly an-
nounced likely will be fairer than the secret desires of people in power. 
The world is much more filled with secret racists and sexists than with 
secret egalitarians. Listening to people who experience oppression, 
one hears about the dangers of discretion.139 
The issue is not whether law greatly helps oppressed people, but 
whether the exercise of discretion is likely to be more oppressive than 
the application oflaw. Several reasons suggest that rule-following will 
be less harmful to oppressed people than discretion. Judges, like the 
rest of us, exist in a world pervaded by unconscious prejudices.140 
Although both our rules and our discretionary decisions will reflect 
these presuppositions, rules have a much better chance of being 
purged of oppressive instincts than do exercises of discretion. Publicly 
enacted rules must be debated in forums generally. \lostile to expres-
sion of hate-filled sentiments. Obviously, this process does not create 
perfect laws, but it can have an effect. Individuals' intuitions often 
avoid this process.141 
Nor would the benefits of a discretionary system outweigh the 
harms. Consider what would happen if rather than our current statu-
tory and constitutional regime, courts were empowered to "remedy 
discrimination when it seemed best all things considered." Although 
some judges would order more remedies, and others fewer than now, it 
seems to me that the number of curren:tly precluded 'claims that would 
137. Massaro, supra note 132, at 2117 (footnote omitted); see glso id. at 2115 (arguing that 
the call to context overestimates the value of empathy because it is homophobia, not distance 
created by the rule of law, that leads to decisions like Hardwick). · 
138. See Schauer, supra note 66, at 543 ("It may be a liability to get in the way of wise 
decision makers • . • . However, it may be an asset to restrict misguided, incompetent, wicked, 
power-hungry, or simply mistaken decisionmakers w~ose own sense of the good might diverge 
from that of the system they serve."); Radin, Presumptive Positivism and Trivial Cases (forthcom-
ing in HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY.) (explaining that rules are useful less for predictability than as 
devices for minimizing expected risks of error). 
139. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 136, at ~7-08. . 
140. See generally Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protectio11: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). 
141. I do not mean this argument to be a priori. Currently it seems to me that publicly 
acceptable discussion is much more progressive than the private opinions of most people, includ-
ing most judges. Perhaps this has not always been true. 
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be remedied under a discretionary regime would be dwarfed by the 
number of currently prohibited acts of discrimination that would be 
permitted under the discretionary regime. Civil rights laws offer a 
good example. The experience there has not been primarily one of 
judges, otherwise anxious to offer remedies, being constrained by the 
statutory language. Rather, the statutes have been implemented more 
often by judges grudgingly admitting that they could not avoid a 
remedy. 
Of course, constraining judges has costs. Blind adherence to rules 
forecloses visionary as well as oppressive decisions. Rules lead to, as 
well as prevent, mistakes.142 In deciding whether we desire more or 
less constrained decisionmaking, we must consider how risk averse we 
should be toward possible abuses, and how hopeful we are about bene-
ficial departures from law. If oppressed people prefer rules to discre-
tion, they do not ignore the very real drawbacks to constraint. They 
conclude that compelling decisionmakers to give publicly acceptable 
reasons that take. the form of following the law will more often con-
strain oppressive rather than progressive instincts. 
c. Entrenched commitment. Critique seems to me a tactical error 
for a third reason: the dilemma faced by social movements would not 
change in stage three. Judges would discuss values rather than laws. 
But the formal equality/substantive equality equivocation, as well as 
ambiguities in the ideal of autonomy, would still persist at the level of 
values. 
Perhaps critics think that values such as formal equality would be 
displaced once values were explicitly discussed by judges. I think this 
unlikely. Many ethicists maintain commitment to formal equality. 
Further, even if no good intellectual reasons justified formal equality, 
strong psychological reasons would make rejection of formal equality 
unlikely. Believing in formal equality makes people feel better about 
the world and enables them to rationalize aspects of life that make 
them uncomfortable. The equality myth rationalizes the judge's ac-
cess to relative wealth and luxury even in the face of the poverty that 
judges encounter. Avoiding the unpleasantness of this unfairness is 
important to almost anyone in a position of advantage. 143 People have 
few obvious mechanisms for coping with these facts other than the 
equality myth. Unlike when they abandon belief in neutral rule appli-
cation, judges cannot fall back on their own moral views to justify 
inequality. Perhaps critique can induce judges to see that they are 
142. See Scalia, The Rule of Law asa Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1177 (1989); 
Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law (forthcoming in HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY.). 
143. See M. LERNER, supra note 30. 
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moral agents who harm people; it will not induce them to view them-
selves as moral agents acting within an unjust system and therefore 
harming people without justification. Judges could not continue with-
out some way to believe that they act justly. Finally, some people 
have suggested that belief in formal equality facilitates racism.144 If 
so, this belief might not be abandoned until people reject the racist 
beliefs that make formal equality attractive. 
Whether values such as formal equality are accepted by legal elites 
because they are normatively appealing, because they are rationaliza-
tions that help elites deny unfairness, or because those elites are really 
racists, trashing the rule of law will not likely undermine such com-
mitments. The difficulties of social change would remain in stage 
three because the discourse of rights (like other neutrality theories) 
does not prevent social change. It is so manipulable that anything 
could be formulated as a right. Of course, this very manipulability 
means that victories are not what they seem. When you ask for equal-· 
ity, perhaps you want a commitment to ending unequal outcomes, and 
all you get is a commitment to formal equality. Still, you could have 
asked for a right to substantive equality and have been engaged in 
rights discourse. 
Disempowered people have often been unable to ask for what they 
want directly not because of rights discourse, but because they knew 
the answer would be "no." The answer would be "no" because polit-
ical pressure or the judge's own values, interests, psychological de-
fenses, or prejudices did not permit the desired relief. Depriving 
judges of neutrality theories will not alter their values, interests, 
prejudices, or psychological needs. No simple way of asking or de-
manding will win oppressed people relief. Instead, it must become im-
possible for those in power to continue to believe that society is 
legitimate without giving in to the demand. The goal must be to make 
Americans look at discrimination and oppression without being able 
to tell themselves that this is acceptable. Dismantling belief in law is 
not well aimed at this goal. 
We should be working in the opposite direction-to find a way to 
create a community in which law will confine more than it does now. 
144. Kim Crenshaw has argued: 
The rationalizations once used to legitimate Black subordination based on a belief in racial 
inferiority have now been reemployed to legitimate the domination of Blacks though refer-
ence to an assumed cultural inferiority . 
• . • Racism, combined with equal opportunity mythology, provides a rationalization for 
racial oppression, making it difficult for whites to see the Black situation as illegitimate or 
unnecessary. 
Crenshaw, supra note 95, at 1379-80. 
346 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:296 
As Martha Minow has said: "The use of rights discourse affirms com-
munity, but it affirms a particular kind of community: a community 
dedicated to invigorating words with power to restrain, so that even 
the powerless can appeal to those words."145 
Perhaps, however, I have misunderstood the role of critique. CLS 
scholars might understand that stage three would not turn conserva-
tives into leftists, nor eradicate racism or sexism, nor convince people 
to abandon belief in formal equality as a value. Nonetheless they 
might believe that stage three is a necessary prelude to their social 
program. Perhaps judges use the belief in their neutrality as a means 
of avoiding examining the wisdom of their values, or the possibility 
that they are illicitly influenced by unacceptable ideas. If so, removing 
rule following as an explanation of their decisions could be a useful 
prelude to inducing them to consider these things more carefully. 
On the other hand, judges who believe that they should generally 
follow the law might be more receptive to arguments that the law is 
racist or otherwise unacceptable. The challenge would be less directly 
aimed at the judge, and therefore would be less threatening. Because 
judges frequently modify rules, find exceptions, and overrule cases, 
certain ideals might be challenged without convincing the judges they 
were in fact altering the law, or that they can always do so. 
Even if stage three would make somewhat more likely the possibil-
ity that judges consider whether they have been racist or have adopted 
bad values, trying to induce stage three as a prelude to social change 
seems imprudent. It risks failing and inducing stage two, which would 
undermine rule of law virtues without any benefit to those concerned 
about discrimination. And even in stage three, people would remain 
very attached to their commitments. 
The analysis in Part II has canvassed various potential virtues and 
vices of introspection. I recognize that the harms and benefits that I 
identify are themselves somewhat controversial. Not everyone cares 
about constraint, decision by consensus, movement toward an egalita-
rian society, or the particular sort of society envisioned by CLS writ-
ers. Many people who like some of these benefits will dislike or care 
little about others. I have sought to justify nonintrospective judging 
with separate arguments aimed at readers with different commitments. 
I have offered some reasons to convince someone who values tradi-
tional virtues (constraint and consensus) that a system with these vir-
tues is made more stable by nonintrospection. I have offered other 
145. Minow, supra note 99, at 1881. Although I agree with Minow about constraint, she 
does not share my views on introspection. See Minow & Spelman, supra note 83, at 54-55. 
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reasons to those who aim at social transformation to accept this same 
conclusion. 
The arguments I advance in this article, and therefore the conchi-
sions I suggest, are hardly conclusive. At many points I have assumed 
facts and relied on intuitions. For example, I assumed that judges 
have somewhat inaccurate beliefs about their decisionmaking process, 
and that accurate understandings present some real risk that judges 
would turn cynical. Though I have offered reasons for these assump-
tions, I cannot prove them. Similarly, I have speculated about the 
benefits and drawbacks to reduced constraint. Yet in the end we can-
not know for certain what unchosen alternatives would produ«?e. Fi-
nally, my analysis has been wholly consequentialist. Even if I have 
been right, nonconsequentialist moral concerns remain. For example, 
we might violate norms against using others only as means if we mis-
lead judges, or if we do not encourage them to understand, merely to 
achieve social ends. Further, judging might itself be a moral activity 
requiring self knowledge. Perhaps we diminish the morality of our 
community by having any institution requiring deception, no matter 
what its benefits. 
Acknowledging all these difficulties, I assert that we act at best 
with uncertainty when we demand introspection. Although judges 
might already understand their decisions, and although introspection 
might not plunge them into cynicism, we act taking these risks. As to 
the moral concerns, I have no answer, save that consequences matter 
to me, and that failing to encourage introspection strikes me as accept-
able even though intentionally misleading others is not. 
I conclude now with some thoughts on how problematic legal 
scholarship and teaching become in a nontransparently justified legal 
system if judges hold inaccurate but somewhat self-fulfilling beliefs. 
Ill. POSTSCRIPT: THE ACADEMICS' DILEMMA 
The questions I have considered pose problems for the legal 
scholar and teacher. 146 We face a dilemma. As scholars we seek 
truth, but as teachers, we must realize that we help socialize the indi-
viduals whose behavior we study. Because we teach students about a 
system they will enter, what we teach them might change the sys-
146. The questions have been discussed at length. See, e.g., Carrington, Of Law and the 
River, 34 J. LEG. EDUC. 222 (1984); "Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic 
Freedom. 35 J. LEG. EDUC. 1 (1985) (collecting responses to Carrington's article); Levinson, 
Professing the Law: Commitment of Faith or Detached Analysis?, 31 ST. Lams U. L.J. 3 (1986) 
(and collected comments). 
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tem.147 What should we do if speaking the truth threatens to make the 
system that we describe less just?I4S 
My arguments, if believed, intensify the discomfort of this ques-
tion. If oversimplified beliefs about the legal system help to make the 
system function better, what should we tell our students?149 If we fol-
low our professional norms, and our usual moral intuitions, we will 
simply tell the truth. But then we risk affecting the world in ways we 
should regard as harmful. If we consciously dissemble, adopting Hou-
dini's attitude toward teaching and scholarship, we may find our jobs 
unfulfilling, or even morally impermissible.150 Silence is no answer. 
In the course of this article, I have argued that a particular solu-
tion to this professional tension - demanding transparent justification 
and introspective practice - is imprudent. In this last Part, I want to 
express some regret at the problems with transparent justification of 
the legal system. I note the difficulty of our present circumstance, and 
my sympathy with the sentiments that led people to demand intro-
spection and transparency. 
The predicament of the legal scholar and the predicament of the 
judge are not really dissimilar. Each is in a position to have some 
influence, though the judge's is more direct and profound. The profes-
sional norms for both require that their written products display some 
frankness about their own thoughts. The judge must disclose the ar-
guments that convince her that a particular legal outcome is correct. 
The scholar must disclose the facts, arguments, or values that per-
147. Of course, students do not hear, much less believe, everything we say in the classroom. 
Very few lawyers and judges read what we write in law reviews, especially lately. But some of 
them hear some of it, and many of them probably misunderstand much of it. As teachers, we 
must take responsibility for the consequences of what they understand us to say. 
148. Because what we say could have an effect, we cannot ignore the dilemma. See R. KEE-
TON, supra note 39, at 11 (''What lawyers, law teachers, and judges say to each other and to 
students about the quality of judging may tend to be self-fulfilling prophecy."). Owen Fiss has 
not come to terms with this difficulty. He says, "Law professors are not paid to train lawyers, 
but to study the law and to teach their students what they happen to discover." "Of Law and the 
River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, supra note 146, at 26 (letter from Owen M. Fiss 
to Paul D. Carrington). 
149. SeeNonet, The Rule of Law: lsthattheRulethat Was?, in THE RULE OP LAW: IDEAL 
OR IDEOLOGY, supra note 40, at 125 (discussing the conflict between the desire of the teacher to 
expose the "truth" about the law and the teacher's moral responsibility to educate students about 
legal ideals). 
150. Although I have not seen anyone say so in print, I have heard people wonder whether 
some scholars have not already adopted Houdini's view toward their scholarship. I have no 
insight into this question, and therefore offer no speculation. However, one candidate for a polit-
ically motivated scholarly stance is retraction of indeterminacy. Of course, perfectly good intel-
lectual reasons support retracting one's previously stated belief in indeterminacy, such as that it 
is false. But some people speculate that it has become clear to some critical scholars that - as I 
have argued in this paper - the indeterminacy thesis is both partially self-fulfilling, and politi-
cally harmful to the left. 
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suade her the world is as she describes it, or should be as she 
recommends. 
For both, the predicament arises from demanding introspective 
practices: scholars notice that judges - even if they report their deci-
sion process frankly (which they do not always do)-fail to recognize 
all the ways they mislead themselves. So the scholars demand intro-
spection. If the judges believe the scholars, and become more intro-
spective about their jobs, they face a dilemma. They can find some 
different language to speak so that they preserve the candor of some 
decisions, or they can retain the language of those decisions, knowing 
that they act duplicitously. The dilemma is especially hard because 
language does not always exist that permits judges to decide in a way 
that they and the community can agree is legitimate. 
Scholars face a similar dilemma. At first they notice that judges 
are not doing what judges say they are doing. Scholars express this in 
their articles and in their classes. While scholars write and speak, they 
tell themselves that they are simultaneously and unproblematically 
both scholars - speaking the truth as they see it - and activists -
demystifying the law as a prelude to social change or, in the traditional 
version, as a prelude to open discussion. Perhaps, like judges, scholars 
need to believe this story to justify their activities. 
CLS scholars must either give up speaking the truth and become 
self-conscious manipulators, or become ineffective, and perhaps 
counterproductive, advocates. As things stand, the only frank kind of 
scholarship that critical scholars can engage in is trashing and the oc-
casional utopian vision. I have tried to argue that trashing, at least 
indiscriminate trashing, is bad politics. More political benefits are 
gained by forming alliances, which usually includes speaking the lan-
guage of those in power. Yet most CLS scholars cannot speak the 
language of formalism and neutrality in good faith. So the only alter-
native seems to be attempting to convince those in power to speak a 
language that CLS scholars can use. Seeking this alternative perhaps 
motivates the otherwise inexplicable insistence that we should just talk 
about needs. 151 It is not that critical scholars are convinced they could 
win conservatives over with needs talk. Rather, critical scholars be-
lieve they could get back into the game of advocacy if this language 
were in vogue. Demands for transparency can be seen as scholars' 
attempt to help themselves out of this situation. 
This solution might also help judges out of their dilemma. If only 
151. Tusbnet, supra note 96, at 1394. But see Crenshaw, supra note 95, at 1365 n.134 (point-
ing out that needs rhetoric is subject to many of the same criticisms as is rights rhetoric). 
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judges would abandon the language of rules and precedent (or use it 
less often) and simply talk as if they lived under a system of discretion-
ary decisions, they could once again candidly and even introspectively 
disclose their reasons for decision. 
This vision is appealing. Recall the three stages that both scholars 
and judges might find themselves in. In stage one, they believe that 
law can sometimes be a practice of rule following. Judges will often be 
able to report their experience of decision as an acceptable opinion 
without much conscious modification. Likewise, scholars are able to 
say - in terms that judges will find to be acceptable legal arguments 
- what really seems to bother them about judicial decisions. In stage 
one, although they are perhaps naive, both scholars and judges have 
the comfort of being able to disclose their thoughts candidly as an 
acceptable public dic;course . 
. In stage two, some or all scholars and judges come to believe that 
rules are extremely manipulable, and that the opinions that purport to 
follow rules, and report the experience of feeling bound, are rhetoric. 
Judges who come to hold this view must choose between writing unac-
ceptable but candid decisions, and writing the sort of manipulative un-
frank. opinion that they think other judges write. As I argued above, I 
suspect that judges would pick the second.152 
Scholars who believe that judges are acting duplicitously also face 
a difficult choice in stage two. They can write traditional articles criti-
cizing courts for making doctrinal mistakes, either in the hope of influ-
encing those judges who still believe in doctrine, or in the hope of 
making the job of doctrinal manipulation more difficult for political 
opponents on the bench. This places the scholar in the position of 
making arguments that she sees as just rhetoric. Alternatively, the 
scholar can announce that judges are in stage two. This act may drive 
judges from stage one into stage two. Also, it is not certain this act 
will ·have any desired political effect, even though it permits the 
scholar to say what she really thinks. In particular, I doubt it will 
drive judges to stage three. 
In stage three, judges and scholars finally understand how prob-
lematic rule following has become and see that almost no one is any 
longer able to engage in frank opinion writing (or scholarship). They 
therefore manage somehow to alter professional discourse so that 
many or all legal decisions are openly discretionary, and justification 
involves discussing values. Stage three offers comfort. As in stage 
152. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. 
November 1990] Beyond Candor 351 
one, judges and scholars can once again speak their minds candidly in 
an acceptable public discourse. . 
Although each of these stages has virtues and vices, perhaps we 
should prefer an uncomfortable existence between stages one and two 
to aiming for stage three. If we try to get there, I think we will fail in 
harmful ways. 
Overcoming self-deception is often healthy, occasionally noble, 
and sometimes morally required. Judges in some circumstances ought 
to become more introspective.153 Introspection can have liberating 
consequences. Certainly we admire some great literature for its ability 
to unmask our daily self-deceptions and denials. We also rightly ad-
mire introspective and candid people. We rightly value truth and can-
dor. Nevertheless, introspection can be debilitating,154 and trying to 
compel introspection can have unwanted side effects. Some useful be-
liefs are partly self-fulfilling, but cannot withstand introspection.155 In 
professing the law, we must consider how sure we are that we want 
introspective judging, and how we expect· critique to be an instrument 
for effecting this goal. 
Our legal system cannot be justified transparently. Judges are 
neither fully introspective nor self-conscious deceivers. By demanding 
that judges be wholly introspective, we risk cynicism and deception 
displacing somewhat inaccurate candor. We must be careful not to 
make our ideals less attainable by pomting out the ways in which we 
have not reached them.156 
153. For example, the substantial literature urging judges to take account of other perspec-
tives seems correct See, e.g., Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574 (1987); 
Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations. 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REv. 323 (1987); Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered. 101 HARv. L. REv. 10 (1987); Minow 
& Spelman, supra note 83, at 50-53. But see Massaro, supra note 132, at 2113 (warning that the 
call for increased empathy is really a call for a substantive reordering of empathic responses). 
Judges might reach better decisions if they made an effort to view si~?ons in other ways. 
154. See s. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS (1989); D. GoLEMAN, supra note 63. 
155. But cf. P. RICOEUR, THE SYMBOLISM OF EVIL 351 (E. Buchanan trans. 1967) (discuss-
ing second naivete). 
156. Many readers have gently pointed out the awkwardness of publishing this article where 
judges might read il Haven't I, they ask, just told Anne's parents that the girl under the tree is 
not their daughter? One reader suggested that my article might itself provide a complex rational-
ization to judges who want to believe they follow law. I offer them a justification not to think 
about il 
I justify my publication on less ambitious grounds. Judges are exceptionally busy. Few have 
the time to read long jurisprudence articles. Further, even ifl am sufficiently fortunate that some 
judges read this article, I do not worry about transforming their thinking. If my thoughts are 
true, converting judges requires sustained public attacks, such as those made by legal realists and 
by critical legal scholars. Given the strong psychological reasons, not to mention intellectual 
reasons, for judges not to agree with my position, to fear that my small contribution to this 
debate could alter legal culture would be hubris out of the ordinary even for a law professor. 
